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VIEWING UNCONSCIONABILITY
THROUGH A MARKET LENS
David Gilo and Ariel Porat*

This Article calls for a move to the third phase in courts' attitudes toward
consumer contracts. In the first phase, consumer contracts were
considered ordinary contracts by courts thus requiring no special
treatment. In the second phase, courts and legislatures became suspicious
of consumer contracts and developed several tools for handling them,
focusing on the characteristics of the parties and the transaction. In this
Article, we suggest that it is time to introduce a third phase: Rather than
examining each consumer contract in isolation, courts need to
acknowledge that consumer contracts are a market-phenomenon which
calls for a market-based approach. Instead of focusing on the
characteristics of the parties and the transaction, courts should inquire
whether there is competition, or potential competition, over contracts in
the supplier’s market. In order to do so, courts should look at the
particular features of the supplier’s market, that we identify, and also on
the potential strategic interaction among competitors. We argue that when
competition over contracts, or the threat of such competition, is
sufficiently strong, consumer contracts should be deemed efficient and
fair, and courts should not strike down clauses incorporated in such
contracts. Interestingly, and counter-intuitively, this conclusion holds even
where consumers are uninformed. We offer workable guidelines for courts
as to how they could implement the market-based approach proposed in
this Article and show how this approach could produce outcomes opposite
to, but more efficient and fair, than the ones conventionally adopted by
courts or offered by legal scholars.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose you buy a computer from a manufacturer of electronic equipment, and after
a few days of use the computer breaks down. Even though you had purchased a warranty
from the seller you find out that it does not cover your losses. The reason is that a clause
in the fine print limits recovery to losses caused by some components of the computer but
not by others. The question of whether to strike down such a clause is generally
determined by courts according to a combination of three considerations, mostly under
the doctrine of unconscionability:1 first, the information gap between the supplier and his
consumers, which exists when consumers are not aware of the full value loss the clause
entails;2 second, whether the supplier enjoys superior bargaining power;3 third, the degree
of harshness, or one-sidedness, of the clause.4
Law and economics scholars have argued that only the consideration regarding the
information gap should matter. The reason is that even if a supplier possessed superior
bargaining power, it would not incorporate an inefficient clause into its standard form
contract if consumers were aware of the clause and its full cost to them; the supplier
would always prefer to have an efficient contract. To the extent that the supplier had
superior bargaining power it would use it to raise the price rather than to impose an
inefficient clause.5 It is only when consumers are unaware of the clause or of the full cost
it is imposing upon them that the supplier can extract value from consumers by
incorporating inefficient terms into its standard form contracts.6 Therefore, the law and
economics literature concludes that intervention is justified if, and only if, consumers
lack sufficient information.7
Surprisingly, however, the question of how courts should verify whether consumers
are informed remained under-explored in legal writings. As a result, courts conduct a
transaction-specific analysis as to whether there is a gap of information between the
supplier in question and his consumers and reach decisions accordingly. Determining
whether consumers are sufficiently informed in a particular case, or in a particular
market, however, is an extremely formidable task for courts.
1

Infra Section III.A.
Infra note 99 and accompanying text.
3
Infra note 99 and accompanying text.
4
Infra note 101 and accompanying text.
5
Infra note 13 and accompanying text.
6
Infra note 15 and accompanying text.
7
As shown by Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979), if there are enough
sophisticated consumers who shop and compare the terms of suppliers’ deals, suppliers will be motivated
to offer efficient contracts. See also Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit? 37 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2008) (showing that when the number of informed consumers is sufficiently large,
suppliers would refrain from including inefficient terms in their contracts). It remains to be asked what a
court should do when it is claimed that a large portion of consumers is uninformed. Our article provides a
tool to deal with such cases.
2
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This Article offers a new method for courts to consider whether to strike down an
oppressive term. The Article's claim is that instead of trying to explore directly whether
there is a gap of information between the supplier and his consumers, courts should
inquire whether market forces have the potential to close this gap. In particular, we
develop tools according to which courts should determine whether the supplier’s market
encourages competing suppliers, or other parties, to draw consumers' attention to
inefficient or unfair terms in the supplier’s contract.8 If the answer is "yes" the contract
should be deemed efficient and fair and courts should not intervene against it; if the
answer is "no", courts should be suspicious of oppressive terms in the contract and apply
the transaction-specific analysis they currently apply to such contracts. Thus, in the
computer example mentioned above, it is very difficult for a court to determine whether
the buyer of the computer, or many of the supplier’s consumers, are sufficiently
informed. Nevertheless, we claim that courts should not intervene if they are convinced
that the computer supplier’s market encourages its competitors, or other parties, to expose
to consumers inefficient or unfair exclusionary clauses in the supplier’s contracts.
The virtue of our proposed market-based method is not only that it circumvents the
prohibitive costs of inquiring whether consumers are informed. It also helps identify
cases where consumers are known or presumed to be uninformed but where nevertheless
court intervention is unwarranted. In particular, if consumers are uninformed, as long as
there is a credible threat that competitors or other parties allude consumers' attention to
suppliers’ inefficient or unfair terms, no supplier would incorporate such terms in its
contract in the first place. Thus, in equilibrium, when the threat of competition over
contracts is credible, contracts should be deemed efficient and fair and any court
intervention is unwarranted. To illustrate, in the computer example above, courts should
not strike down the exclusionary clause if they are convinced that in the relevant
computer market, had the clause been inefficient or unfair, competitors or other parties
would have criticized it, and the supplier would have lost market share.9
8

In our terminology, fairness in a contract exists when the bargain is consistent with both parties'
reasonable expectations. According to this terminology, any fair contract is also efficient, since, when both
parties to a contract are informed, the contract is not only fair, but also efficient. Not every efficient
contract is necessarily fair, however. For example, if the contract allocates risks efficiently, and the
consumer values the product more than the product’s marginal cost, the contract is efficient. The same
contract, however, could still be unfair if the supplier reaps most of the contract’s surplus by using
deceptive techniques, thereby frustrating the consumer’s reasonable expectations. See, e.g., W. David
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529,
531 (1971) ("An unfair form will not deter sales because the seller can easily arrange his sales so that few if
any buyers will read his forms, whatever their terms ...").
9
Previous authors have mentioned, in specific contexts, that competition among suppliers could educate
consumers about inefficient terms in consumer contracts. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, My Way and the
Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U.
L. REV. 700, 716 (1992) (stating, in the context of choice of forum clauses in consumer contracts, that if a
firm uses inefficient terms with a low price, a rival firm offering efficient terms with a higher price would
want to highlight this fact); Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market
Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 111 (2006) (arguing that when consumers overvalue a product, a
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As we show, the effectiveness of competition over contracts in deterring suppliers
from using inefficient or unfair standard form contracts crucially depends on the nature of
the oppressive techniques used by suppliers. We distinguish between four oppressive
techniques, only the first one has been attracting courts' scrutiny and attention, while the
other three have been, for the most part, ignored by courts, even though they are very
common and could be very harmful. The first and most familiar technique is to
incorporate terms into the contract which deprive the consumer of a right or a remedy to
which she would have been entitled but for the oppressive terms (hereinafter: "traditional
oppressive term" or "TOT"). Clauses limiting the supplier’s liability such as the one
described in the above-mentioned computer example are illustrative of such terms. The
second technique is to incorporate terms into the contract which are oppressive only for
some consumers but not for others. Typically, those who are not offended by the terms
are consumers who were aware of their existence, and made some effort to avoid their
adverse effects (hereinafter: "selectively oppressive term" or "SOT"). An example of a
SOT is a term that deprives consumers of a remedy, but allows consumers who carefully
read the contract to relieve themselves of the oppressive term.10 The third technique is to
incorporate contract terms which confer benefits on some consumers but not on others
(hereinafter: "selectively beneficial term" or "SBT"). As in the case of a SOT, with an
SBT only those consumers who make some effort to attain the benefits will receive them.
A typical example is a term, included in the fine print, allowing a discount only for a
consumer who is aware of the term and is willing to fill out a certain form to receive the
discount.11 The fourth and last oppressive technique that we identify is artificial
complication of contracts. Under this technique, by making contracts more complex,
suppliers can extract benefits from consumers.12
seller of a better product is expected to draw away such consumers by trumpeting their mistake); David
Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of
Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 1009,
at note 64 (2006) (mentioning that “the saliency of terms is, for the most part, endogenous: a supplier could
snatch business from his rival by highlighting the rival’s harsh nonsalient terms.”); Xavier Gabaix & David
Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets,
121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 506 (2006) (identifying that when suppliers try to exploit consumers’ mistakes,
competing suppliers may wish to expose such exploitation). But see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler,
Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements 5 J.
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 468 (2008) (finding no statistically significant relationship between the
degree of competition in software markets and the incidence of pro-supplier fine print.) To the best of our
knowledge, however, ours is the first article to formulate this basic notion into a systematic methodology
courts should pursue when assessing consumer contracts.
10
For example, a contract which states that the supplier bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to
90 days, unless the consumer asks otherwise at the time of purchase and fills out the requisite forms. For
further discussion, see infra Section I.B.1.
11
For further discussion see infra Section I.C.1.
12
For example, a supplier of services, who provides several different plans, in a way that makes it
difficult for a consumer to evaluate which plan best suits him. For further discussion, see infra Section
I.D.1. See Gilo and Porat, supra note 9, at 1004-1005 (showing how suppliers can use complexity of their
consumer contracts in order to stifle competition); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of
Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 1073, 1102-6 (2009) (showing how complex
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The Article demonstrates how among the four oppressive techniques, only the
traditional one, the TOT, is sufficiently affected by competition over contracts. We show
how such competition cannot deter suppliers from using inefficient or unfair SOTs, SBTs
or artificial complexity. Courts should therefore be particularly suspicious of SOTs, SBTs
and artificial complexity, and analyze them on a case by case basis, disregarding the
degree of competition over contracts in the market.
TOTs, however, should be assessed differently. Since inefficient or unfair TOTs
could be effectively eliminated by competition over contracts, they should be analyzed
according to the market-based method we develop here. Rather than analyzing TOTs on
the basis of the parties to the contract and their characteristics, as courts currently do,
according to this Article's proposal courts should explore the structure of the supplier’s
market and the nature and capabilities of the supplier’s rivals. Furthermore, the Article
lists four factors that could hinder the ability of competition to expose TOTs. When these
factors are particularly strong, competition over contracts cannot be counted upon and
courts should scrutinize consumer contracts according to the transaction-specific analysis
they currently apply. The four factors are:
(1) Backfiring: sometimes suppliers might avoid criticizing their rivals' TOT so as to
avoid a negative backfiring effect on themselves. There are three types of backfiring:
Consumers’ backfiring on the product occurs when criticizing a rival’s oppressive
technique could expose weaknesses in the criticizer’s own product or service;13
Consumers’ backfiring on the contract occurs when exposing a rival’s TOT requires the
criticizing supplier to stop using similar TOTs himself; rivals’ backfiring occurs when the
criticized supplier is driven to retaliate.
(2) Attracting Unwanted Consumers: At times when a supplier exposes TOTs in his
rivals' contracts he ends up “gaining” unwanted, high-cost consumers.14 This could be a
reason not to engage in such an exposition in the first place.
(3) Benefit Externalization: A supplier might avoid criticizing his competitors' TOTs
because the benefits of such efforts would be shared by other rival suppliers, while the
criticizing supplier would shoulder the entire cost.15
sub-prime mortgage contracts are and explaining accordingly that competition could not solve
inefficiencies in such contracts).
13
See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market
Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 339 (2000) (arguing that firms may not want to
advertise the safety of their product because this raises consumers’ awareness to the risk in all such
products and reduces their demand); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The
Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1680-81 (2006) (arguing that a firm
may not want to highlight that it does not bind arbitration in a distant forum so as not to draw consumers’
attention to the probability of disputes).
14
See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1242-43 (2003) (arguing that a firm would not want to brag about its lack of an
arbitration clause because this might attract consumers liable to sue the firm).
15
See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491,
527 (1981) (claiming that firms may not have suitable incentives to disclose to consumers positive
information about their product when rivals selling the same product would share the benefits from such
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(4) Irresponsive consumers: In certain situations many consumers would not change their
consumption decisions even if competition exposing the TOT were to take place. In such
cases highlighting a rival supplier’s TOT could be unrewarding.16
This Article offers to courts a coherent and systematic method for assessing TOTs
based on these insights. For example, it shows how, contrary to the conventional wisdom,
a TOT is more likely to be efficient and fair in a (competitive) market in which most
suppliers adopt it. It also shows how a (competitive) market for a product or service that
is essential to consumers justifies less intervention against TOTs than a market in which
the product or service is non-essential. Also, in many instances, TOTs that qualify a right
granted by the supplier himself should be treated more leniently than TOTs that qualify a
default rule imposed by law. Accordingly, the Article offers courts workable guidelines
according to which they can shape their intervention policies against consumers'
contracts.
The Article also demonstrates how competition over contracts takes place in the real
world. It provides numerous examples of suppliers’ campaigns criticizing their rivals'
contracts.17 The incidence of such campaigns actually understates the true impact of
competition over contracts for two reasons. First, it is expected that many suppliers
engage in covert efforts to criticize their rivals, e.g., through their sales representatives.
Second, in a market in which a credible threat of competition over contracts exists, TOTs
are expected to be efficient and fair even where no such competition is actually observed:
In such markets, suppliers would be deterred from employing inefficient or unfair TOTs.
The Article is organized as follows: In Part I we describe the four oppressive
techniques, discuss the motivations for suppliers to use them, and also expose their
potential welfare-reducing and welfare-enhancing effects. In this part, we shall ignore the
corrective potential of competition over contracts. Part II considers how competition
affects the efficiency and fairness of each of the four oppressive techniques identified in
Part I. As we show, intense competition over contracts could expose inefficient and
unfair TOTs, but not SOTs, SBTs and Complexity. As a result, we propose that SOTs,
SBTs and artificial complexity, which are not subject to market discipline, be analyzed
according to strict case by case scrutiny. In this part we also analyze the factors that could
prevent competition over contracts from guaranteeing efficient TOTs. Part III draws
workable guidelines from the results obtained in Parts I and II as to how courts could
employ the market-based methodology to TOTs. Conclusions follow.

disclosure); Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority
to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 659 (1996) (same).
16
See Korobkin, supra note 14 (claiming that highlighting the existence of a forum selection clause is
not likely to change consumers’ purchase decisions).
17
See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
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I. OPPRESSIVE TECHNIQUES
In this Part we present four oppressive techniques used by suppliers in their contracts
with consumers. Only the first one was discussed in court decisions. With regard to each
technique we expose suppliers’ motivations for employing it and evaluate it from a social
perspective. The effects of competition on each technique are ignored at this stage.
A. Traditional Oppressive Terms
1. The Technique
Many standard form contracts contain terms which deprive consumers of rights or
remedies to which they would be entitled but for these terms. We call such terms
"Traditional Oppressive Terms" (or "TOTs"). Example 1 illustrates a TOT.
Example 1. TV Set. In a contract for the provision of a TV set, the time of delivery is set
for January 1, 2009. In the boilerplate, however, there is a clause stating that "the
supplier bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to 90 days."18

While in Example 1 the TOT exempts the supplier from contractual liability, in the
next example, the TOT caps tort damages.
Example 2. The Dry Cleaner. A Dry Cleaner offers its consumers a standard form
contract which contains a term stating that "the Dry Cleaner’s liability per item is
limited to 15 times the fee paid for the damaged or lost item."19

2. Suppliers' Possible Motivations
In order to understand why suppliers use TOTs one should distinguish between two
states of the world: one, where there is no gap of information between the suppliers and
the consumers; the other, where there is such a gap. Absent an information gap between
the supplier and his consumers, there is a solid basis for assuming that the supplier
incorporated the TOT into the contract in order to increase the value of the contract to
18

See Corinno Civetta Constr. Corp. v. New York, 67 N.Y.2d 297, 306 (1986) (stating that "damages
resulting from uncontemplated delays caused by the contractee may be recovered despite the existence of a
broad exculpatory clause relieving the contractee from liability"); In Fowler, Rodriguez, Kingsmill, Flint,
Gray & Chalos, LLP v. Island Properties, LLC, 833 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (2007) the Court ruled that
"[G]enerally, even with such a [broad exculpatory] clause, damages may be recovered for: (1) delays
caused by the contractee's bad faith or its willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct, (2)
uncontemplated delays, (3) delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the
contract by the contractee, and (4) delays resulting from the contractee's breach of a fundamental obligation
of the contract."
19
See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 119-120 (1993) (saying that
standard form contracts are common in markets which are highly competitive, dry cleaning being a typical
example).
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himself as well as to consumers. The explanation is that when both parties to a contract
possess all relevant information, they strive to incorporate efficient terms into their
contract, which increase their mutual benefit.20 This reasoning applies even when one of
the parties (the supplier) enjoys superior bargaining power vis a vis the other party (the
consumer).21 In contrast, when consumers are not fully aware of the loss of value the
TOT imposes upon them, there is a risk that the supplier will incorporate a TOT into his
standard form contracts so as to extract value from consumers, without the latter being
aware of it, and even induce some consumers to buy a product they would not have
bought had they been aware of its true cost to them.22
It is often hard to know by just looking at a TOT whether it is welfare-reducing, or
rather welfare-enhancing. To illustrate, let's return to Example 2 (The Dry Cleaner). At
first glance the TOT in this example seems welfare-reducing: the Dry Cleaner, rather than
the consumer, is in a position to take the necessary precautions to prevent damage to
consumers’ clothes. If the Dry Cleaner bears the harm in its entirety, it will take efficient
precautions to prevent such harm. With the TOT, the supplier’s liability for damaged
clothes is capped, so that he lacks appropriate incentives to take care. But
notwithstanding first appearances, the following subtle point should be considered.
Suppose everyone pays the same fee per item of laundry regardless of its value. With no
cap on damages owed by the Dry Cleaner, consumers owning cheap items would find
themselves subsidizing owners of expensive items. In the long run, many owners of
cheap items would drop out, prices would go up, and eventually the entire service might

20

For the case without an information gap see Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form
Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 586 (1990) ("In a free market,
exchanges among knowledgeable rational people are expected to result in Pareto superior results…");
Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller
Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 363 (1991) (mentioning that sellers have incentives to select an
efficient rule on their own). For the case with an information gap see Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law
& Economics 208 (5th ed. 2008) ("the presence of asymmetric information can sometimes preclude
otherwise mutually beneficial exchanges from taking place."); Handbook of Law and Economics Vol. 1 34
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (hereinafter: Handbook of Law and Economics Vol. 1)
("asymmetric information between the parties at the time a contract is negotiated can lead to distortions in
the resulting contract vis-à-vis the contract that would have been negotiated under symmetric
information.").
21
See A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. OF ECON. 417–29 (1975)
(showing that a monopolist prefers to offer quality preferred by the “marginal consumer” – the first
consumer to leave the supplier when price goes up -- and elect price so as to maximize its profits); Douglas
G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 941 (2006) (explaining that even a monopolist
looks for efficient warranty terms).
22
See Korobkin, supra note 14, at 1217-8 (“Efficiency requires not only that buyers be aware of the
content of form contracts, but also that they fully incorporate that information into their purchase decisions.
Because buyers are boundedly rational rather than fully rational decisionmakers, they will infrequently
satisfy this requirement. … ”); Steven P. Croley & D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case
for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 770 (1993) (arguing that without full information
consumers are unable to make consumption and warranty decisions that reflect their true preferences);
Meyerson, supra note 13, at 585 (same).
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disappear from the market.23 This concern—which a cap on damages mitigates—is the
result of a gap of information between suppliers and consumers, but in a direction
opposite to the one discussed so far. Here it is the suppliers rather than consumers who
lack sufficient information. Suppliers are often ignorant as to whether the consumer with
whom they transact is a high risk (expensive clothes) or low risk (inexpensive clothes)
type. Had the supplier been able to distinguish between high and low risk consumers, the
supplier would have charged each consumer in Example 2 a fee reflecting the value of his
or her item, and a cap on damages would not have been necessary. However, given the
above-mentioned gap of information, the supplier must charge all consumers a uniform
price and a limitation on damages will be necessary for facilitating the provision of the
service to consumers of all types.24
An important lesson to be learned from the example above is that it is difficult for
courts to judge a TOT merely according to its perceived “harshness” or “one-sidedness”.
Thus it is all the more important to provide courts with manageable tools for determining
whether a supplier would want to include a welfare-reducing TOT in his contracts,
without having to assess the TOT’s merits directly. As shown in part II, the market-based
method we propose constitutes such a tool. Before presenting our market-based approach
to TOTs, however, the next section describes the welfare concerns stemming from TOTs.
3. Welfare Concerns
As demonstrated above, absent information gaps in which consumers lack sufficient
information, all terms in standard form contracts should be deemed welfare enhancing
and therefore efficient. There is no need to particularly explore whether a term is
efficient, because, regardless of his bargaining position, the supplier only loses from
including inefficient terms in his contract. As demonstrated, this could be so even with
terms that, at first blush, seem inefficient. Also, no particular fairness concern emerges
when there is no gap of information between the parties, because the consumer got
exactly what he expected, or reasonably could expect, to get.
If, however, consumers are not informed enough as to the oppressive term or its cost
to them, three kinds of efficiency concerns arise. First, suppliers may incorporate terms
into the contract that allocate risks between the parties inefficiently (“inefficient
allocation of risks”). For example, the TV supplier of Example 1 might include the TOT
relieving him from liability for late delivery even when it saves him less than the cost it
imposes on the consumer. Second, regardless of whether the term involves inefficient
23

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 110-111 (7th ed., 2007) (Describing a similar
phenomenon in the case of insurance); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential
Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 105, 137-8 (1989) (justifying reducing damages in order
to prevent the cross-subsidization of some plaintiffs by others).
24
See also Baird, supra note 21, at 940 (arguing that a disclaimer of liability for consequential damages
could be motivated by the supplier's goal of avoiding liability for harms caused by the carelessness of
others).
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allocation of risks, a second form of inefficiency may evolve: many uninformed
consumers might buy products and services they should not have bought (“inefficient
contracting”). For example, regardless of the TOT's efficiency, some consumers who
bought the TV would not have bought it had they been aware of the TOT. Third, and,
again, regardless of whether the TOT allocates risks efficiently, informed consumers
might refrain from buying the product due to the TOT (“inefficient non-contracting”).25
In example 1, the TOT imposes a cost on consumers (due to late delivery) yet this is not
reflected in the TV’s price. A consumer who understands this may well refrain from
buying the TV, although it would have been socially warranted for him to buy it for its
fair price.
The normative concerns with TOTs are not limited to inefficiencies. TOTs also raise
fairness concerns, since they enable suppliers to extract value from consumers without
them being aware of it, and induce consumers to buy products and services they do not
really want. As such, TOTs constitute a form of deception.
Accordingly, when consumers are not well-enough informed, both inefficiency and
unfairness could result. It is here, however, that two crucial questions arise: First, how
can we know whether consumers are well-enough informed? Second, what happens if
consumers are not well-enough informed – should it then be presumed that the TOT
creates inefficient allocation of risks, inefficient contracting, inefficient non-contracting
or unfairness? As we will see in the next parts of the Article, a useful way to answer these
two important questions is to explore the degree and type of competition over contracts in
the supplier’s market.
B. Selectively Oppressive Terms
1. The Technique
As opposed to TOTs, Selectively Oppressive Terms ("SOTs") are oppressive only
for some consumers. Consider the following variation of Example 1.
Example 3. TV Set II. In a contract for the provision of a TV set, the time of delivery is
set for January 1, 2009. In the boilerplate, however, there is a clause stating that "the
supplier bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to 90 days, unless the consumer
asks otherwise at the time of purchase and fills out the requisite forms." Filling out the
requisite forms takes no more than a couple of minutes and entails no benefit to the
supplier.

As opposed to Example 1, in Example 3 any consumer who carefully reads the
standard form contract will understand that she can request the removal of the
25

See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 65, 72-74 (1983) ("[The] misallocation of
resources results in diminished satisfaction of society's wants, and thus, in terms of what society values, a
reduction of society's total wealth.").
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exclusionary clause at no additional costs to her. The only reason for not doing so would
be if the consumer were not aware of the exclusionary clause and her easy way out of it.
Thus, with the type of SOT illustrated in Example 3, there is always an information gap
between the supplier and some of his consumers. Only consumers who bear the
transaction costs involved in a careful reading of the fine print will learn of the SOT and
take costless steps to avoid it.26
An example of a SOT is a term in a contract for the sale of a product, according to
which the product’s warranty is conditioned upon the buyer keeping the original
receipt.27 Only buyers who read the contract and remember to retain the receipt enjoy the
warranty, other buyers forfeit it.28 Another example of a SOT is a term in a travel
insurance policy in which coverage of losses due to theft is conditioned upon reporting
the theft to the police within 24 hours.29 Insureds who either do not read the terms of the
policy carefully or fail to comply with this specific term for other reasons, are denied
compensation, while those who bear the transaction costs of reading the term and
complying with it get fully compensated.30 A third example concerns granting benefits to
consumers, but limiting, in the fine print, eligibility for the benefit to a short period of
time. Many consumers assume they will receive the benefit, while in fact this is so only if
they act promptly.31 A fourth and final example is a term in a car rental contract which
26

Not every SOT is characterized by consumers not being aware that there is a way out of the
oppressive term. To illustrate, suppose that in Example 3, filling out the requisite forms does not take just a
couple of minutes as in the original example, but rather is time consuming. With such a SOT, even if all
consumers are aware of its existence, some of them will give up on filling out the forms so as to save time,
knowing they will then have to bear the costs of the exclusionary clause. Interestingly, in this variation of
Example 3 there is no information gap between any consumer and the supplier. Nevertheless the oppressive
term is selective: some consumers are willing to fill out the forms and relieve themselves of the oppressive
clause, and some are not willing to do so and thus remain subject to this clause.
27
See, e.g., Sagemax’s insurance contract for LCD televisions, instructing that the receipt is "an integral
part" of the contract, and the consumer "may be required to reference it to obtain service.",
www.bhphotovideo.com/find/sagemaxTC.jsp.
28
Arguably, asking for the original receipt could be motivated by the supplier's desire to save
verification costs as to the validity of the warranty. It seems, however, that other means of verification –
certainly in the computer age – could be at least as effective and almost costless.
29
See, e.g., Access America – Travel Insurance & Assistance, Individual Travel Insurance Policy No.
52.201NY 13-14,
http://www.worldnomads.com/policy_wording.aspx?uid=7d4701fdcb8f487dbef849f8673502f1 (offering
coverage for baggage, which states that "[y]ou must notify the appropriate local authorities at the place of
the loss occurred and inform them of the value and description of your property within 24 hours after the
loss.").
30
Here too an argument can be made that reporting to the police immediately serves the insurer's
interests in reducing risks. But it is quite obvious that for many types of thefts, in many countries, reporting
to the police is almost useless, and in any case, the penalty for failing to report within 24 hours—
deprivation of entitlement to any compensation, is allegedly draconian.
31
For example, American Airlines offers a "Low Fare Promise," according to which if the consumer
provides a lower rate on another airline she receives a $50 coupon from American Airlines. In order to
receive such a benefit, among other conditions, the claim must be submitted by midnight on the same day
of the purchase from American Airlines. See http://www.studentscrooge.com/2008/10/09/the-americanairlines-low-fare-guarantee/ (a students’ blog describing the fine print behind American Airlines’ low-fareguarantee).
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penalizes the consumer for not picking up the car she has reserved, but then includes in
the fine print a process for partly waiving the penalty.32 Only consumers who are wellaware of this particular term and who are willing to bear the transaction costs involved in
getting the partial waiver will receive it, many others will not.33
2. Suppliers' Possible Motivations
Suppliers may want to use SOTs for several reasons. To begin with, SOTs involve
benefits for the supplier that resemble those derived from using TOTs: SOTs allow
suppliers to extract value from uninformed consumers. Notwithstanding this similarity
between TOTs and SOTs, a very important distinction between them should be made:
With a TOT, the supplier takes the risk of losing informed consumers who find the TOT
in the fine print and consequently decide not to buy the product. With a SOT, the supplier
can enjoy both worlds: he manages to deceive consumers vulnerable to deception while
retaining consumers who cannot be fooled – informed consumers can buy from the
supplier while escaping the oppressive term.34
Accordingly, SOTs allow suppliers to benefit informed consumers at the expense of
uninformed consumers, thereby discriminating in favor of the former. Such a strategy
could induce informed consumers to buy the supplier’s product or service even when
they would not have bought it otherwise.
Let us illustrate in more detail how SOTs allow suppliers to improve the deal they
offer informed consumers at the expense of the uninformed consumers. Suppose the price
of a supplier’s TV sets when all consumers are fully informed (i.e., without hiding a SOT
in the contract) is 10. A supplier who chooses to incorporate the SOT of Example 3 into
his contracts could exploit uninformed consumers in the following way: he could charge
all consumers a price of 9, but extract a value of 2 from uninformed consumers through
the SOT. In such a scenario, uninformed consumers would be subject to the oppressive
32

Hertz car rental agency, for example, partly refunds the prepayment in case of "No Show", but only "if
you write to us within 90 days of the Pick Up Date at Hertz Prepaid Accounting Department….",
http://www.hertz.com.ro/qualifications.php?topic=Amendments,+Cancellation,+No+Show+-+Lost+Rental.
33
There could also be ex post SOTs, namely, oppressive terms which are applied in a discriminatory
manner by suppliers: See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006) (explaining the efficiencies of many one-sided terms in
consumer contracts, which are selectively applied). Also, “add-ons” – expensive services or products that
are added on to the original deal, bear some resemblense to SOTs. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 9
(analyzing the case of avoidable add-ons, such as the minibar or other servies at a hotel). As with SOTs,
some consumers manage to avoid the add-ons, by not using them, and some end up using them. The
difference between an avoidable add-on (such as a hotel mini bar) and a SOT is that most consumers are
aware of the oppressive add-on before they decide whether to use it. With a SOT, on the other hand,
uninformed consumers are simply unaware of the oppressive term hidden in the fine print, and unaware of
the ability to avoid it.
34
Note that some informed consumers would have entered the contract even if they hadn’t been able to
remove the oppressive term. Supposedly, the supplier could have offered such consumers the same deal
with a TOT and earned more. But for the supplier, it is often more important to retain the more sensitive
informed consumers, who would not have bought the product if they were subject to the oppressive term.
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term hidden in the fine print, relieving the supplier of liability for late delivery. Informed
consumers, who see the SOT and fill out the forms to escape the oppressive term, pay 9
and receive the TV on time. As a result, de facto, it is as if informed consumers pay 9,
while uninformed consumers pay 11. The supplier saves the costs of having to deliver on
time to uninformed consumers. These profits, made at the expense of uninformed
consumers, can be used to enable the price reduction from 10 to 9. Accordingly, informed
consumers, who pay 9 and receive the TV on time, are subsidized by the uninformed
consumers. This benefits the supplier, because informed consumers are typically more
sensitive to the terms of the deal, and many of them would not have bought the TV at the
original price of 10.
Why are informed consumers typically more sensitive to the terms of the deal than
uninformed consumers? Informed consumers are those who waive the SOT and incur the
transaction costs of reading the contract carefully, filling out the requisite forms (as in
Example 3), and so forth. Their willingness to do so can serve as a proxy for their
sensitivity to the terms of the deal.35
In particular, consumers who are willing to pay attention to the fine print and escape
the oppressive term are typically characterized as one (or more) of the following: (a)
those who value their time less and their money more compared to others. Such
consumers are also typically more sensitive to what they receive for their money; (b)
large or repeat buyers, for whom investing the transaction costs involved in a careful
reading and understanding of the contract and filling out the forms is worthwhile given
the high volume of their business with the supplier. Such consumers too are typically
sensitive to oppressive terms in the contract; (c) sophisticated consumers for whom the
transaction costs are relatively low, because they are trained in reading and understanding
such contracts and also in filling out the forms. To the extent that sophisticated
consumers are also those better aware of alternative products, they too are often “trigger
happy” with regard to rejecting the supplier’s product.36
Another reason for suppliers to employ SOTs is that a contract with a SOT may look
more fair than the same contract with a TOT. Suppliers use TOTs to extract value from
uninformed consumers. They bear the risk, however, of courts striking the term down.37
If suppliers use a SOT instead, as in Example 3, they benefit from both worlds: on the
one hand many consumers would shoulder the consequences of the oppressive term
without being aware of it, as with a TOT; but on the other hand, the term cannot be easily
challenged in court because it appears to be fair. After all, in Example 3, a consumer
could easily avoid the exclusionary clause if she filled out the requisite forms. The
supplier could easily come up with an explanation justifying the requirement to fill out

35

Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 996-7 (discussing the imposition of transaction costs on consumers to
distinguish between those who are more price sensitive from those who are less sensitive to price).
36
See id. at 997.
37
Infra Section III.A.
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forms. The above-mentioned car rental example38 could also be explained in this way: the
damages imposed upon the consumer for late delivery could be considered unreasonable
by courts and struck down. However, the court may change its mind if it assumes that
most of the penalty could "easily" be waived in favor of consumers who ask for it to be
waived. The car rental company could come up with a reason for imposing the damages
in the first place, and allowing a subsequent refund at a later stage.
The innocent appearance of the contract could also protect the supplier from public
opinion critics, as well as from his own consumers who might later realize that they
ended up with the worst deal. Such consumers, when acknowledging they could have
easily received the better deal, might tend to blame themselves, not the supplier.39
A final reason suppliers might prefer to use SOTs rather than TOTs is that TOTs, as
we shall see in Part II, could at times expose the supplier to criticism by his rivals, and
cause the supplier to lose market share. As we show, this is not the case with a SOT. A
rival supplier would derive little benefit from criticizing the supplier’s SOT.
3. Welfare Concerns
When consumers are not informed enough, using SOTs could be at least as
problematic as using TOTs: in both cases the supplier extracts value from consumers,
without the latter being aware of it. As with TOTs, SOTs too raise fairness concerns,
could allocate risks inefficiently and might create inefficient contracting by causing
uninformed consumers to buy a product that they don’t really want.40
However, as noted, and unlike TOTs, SOTs can facilitate “price discrimination”
between informed (often more sensitive to the terms of the deal) and uninformed (often
less sensitive to the terms of the deal) consumers. The upside of such discrimination,
from an efficiency perspective, is that it may allow the supplier to improve the terms it
grants to consumers who have waived the SOT and prevent them from deciding to not
buy the product at all.41 Let us label this welfare-enhancing feature of SOTs “bringing
consumers on board.” That is, absent the SOT, efficient transactions between the supplier
and some informed consumers would not have taken place.42

38

Supra text accompanying notes 28-9.
But occasionally the reverse would be true: consumers may develop antagonism toward a supplier
who failed to make the SOT more salient.
40
See supra section I.A.3.
41
See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 139 (1988) (showing how price
discrimination could improve welfare by inducing consumers who are more sensitive to price to buy the
product).
42
SOTs’ ability to discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers could also serve as an
anticompetitive device that facilitates collusion among competing suppliers. The reasons for this resemble
those of Selectively Beneficial Terms (“SBTs”), which will be discussed below See infra note 55 and
accompanying text.
39
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SOTs could also involve a distributional justice concern.43 Because SOTs enable
price discrimination, they cause inequality among consumers: some consumers get better
deals than others.44 However, under a SOT, consumers who enjoy the better deal are
often the less wealthy ones: those who value their time less and their money more
compared to others, and therefore are willing to incur the transaction costs required for
waiving the SOTs.45 This could mitigate, or even overrule, the distributional justice
concerns in using SOTs.
Finally, another important difference between SOTs and TOTs relates to the higher
sustainability of SOTs. If many consumers were informed, socially harmful TOTs would
not survive.46 This is not the case with SOTs, since even with a mass of informed
consumers, the supplier would not remove a socially unwarranted SOT: He would still be
able to exploit the uninformed consumers while keeping the informed consumers
happy.47
In Part II, we show that competition cannot be counted upon to deter suppliers from
using inefficient and unfair SOTs. Hence, in stark contrast to courts’ complete disregard
of SOTs, they actually deserve strict legal scrutiny, even more so than TOTs. While, as
shown in Part II, inefficient or unfair TOTs may be competed away under certain
circumstances, this is shown not to be the case with SOTs.
C. Selectively Beneficial Terms
1. The Technique
The mirror image of a SOT is a Selectively Beneficial Term ("SBT"). While SOTs
are oppressive for only some consumers, SBTs are beneficial for only some consumers.
Example 4 illustrates how an SBT works.

43

It is a controversial question whether the distribution of wealth should be a concern for legal rules or
rather should be left to the tax system. See Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the
Poor? Clarifying the Roles of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEG. STUD.
821 (2000) (arguing for the superiority of the tax system in this respect); TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS,
EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 14-66 (2007) (arguing that distributive justice should be a
concern when defining tort rules). In the context of our discussion, we merely wish to point out, as a
positive matter, that distributive effects exist, without taking sides as to whether these effects also have
normative implications.
44
On the other hand, one could claim that SOTs enhance distributional justice among consumers to the
extent that they cause consumers who value the product more to pay more. Arguably, those who benefit
more from the product should indeed pay more.
45
Supra text accompanying notes 31-2.
46
Supra Section I.A.1; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 7 at 673 (showing that intervention against
contract terms is undesirable when a mass of consumers is sufficiently informed).
47
As noted, Schwartz and Wilde, id. show that when a large enough percentage of consumers are
informed, suppliers are induced to include efficient terms in their contract. They assume, however, that
suppliers offer the same contractual terms to all consumers. In contrast, with a SOT, informed consumers
are relieved from the oppressive term while uninformed consumers are not. This is why a mass of informed
consumers would not suffice to deter the supplier from using a SOT.
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Example 4. Special Discount. A supplier who sells computers offers, in the fine print, a
special discount to consumers who fill out a certain form and mail it back to the
supplier. Only consumers who read the fine print carefully and remember to fill out the
form and mail it, enjoy the special discount.

As opposed to TOTs and SOTs, which create a bad surprise for uninformed and no
surprise for informed consumers, an SBT does not create a surprise for either informed or
uninformed consumers. In Example 4, consumers who do not read the contract and
therefore do not get the special discount are not misled by the supplier: they received
exactly what they had expected! However, with SBTs consumers who bear certain
transaction costs get better deals than others. In this respect SBTs resemble SOTs. To
illustrate, if in the above-mentioned example the posted price for a computer is 11 and
there is a special discount of 2 in the fine print, uninformed consumers end up paying 11,
while informed consumers end up paying only 9.48
There are many real life cases in which consumers who are willing to incur the
transaction costs of reading and understanding their contracts with their suppliers receive
greater benefits. One example is hiding a best price guarantee in the fine-print.49 Another
example is common in subscription sales. Internet service providers often have a
provision in the fine print granting customers signing up an option to cancel within a
certain period of time and get their money back.50 Many consumers are not aware of this
option, and therefore do not execute it. Probably those who are more hesitant about
signing up would tend to incur the transaction costs of exploring all the terms of the
contract offered to them. They are the ones who would utilize the benefit.51

48

As with SOTs, it is possible to distinguish between two types of SBTs: In the first type the transaction
costs a consumer needs to incur in order to receive the benefits consist merely of the time spent in reading
and understanding the contract. The other type of SBT is one where consumers know they are required to
bear transaction costs—such as filling out time-consuming forms—in order to be entitled to the benefits.
49
In this example the supplier undertakes in the fine print to match any competing offer given by
another supplier. See Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and Can
Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 528 (1997). Edlin points out that low-price guarantees
enable price discrimination between customers who cite a competing price and other consumers. Our
additional insight is that suppliers may want to "hide" their low-price guarantees in the fine print, rather
than making them salient, so that only the particularly price-sensitive consumers will take advantage of the
guarantees.
50
See, for example, the terms of sale of Speakeasy, which offers broadband Internet services:
"Speakeasy offers a 25-day Trial Period on all ADSL services… If you feel that you must cancel within 25
calendar days of your Activation Date you may do so without being subject to a Disconnection Fee."
Speakeasy, Terms of Service, http://www.speakeasy.net/tos.
51
Cf. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Business and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857
(2006) (arguing that suppliers often extend benefits beyond standard-form consumer-contract terms and
explaining their motivations for doing so).
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2. Suppliers' Possible Motivations
As is evident from the examples above, the idea behind an SBTs is to confer benefits
only on consumers who appreciate them. Hence, as with SOTs, SBTs extract more value
from uninformed consumers while at the same time attracting informed consumers, who
incur the transaction costs of reading the contract and, as in Example 4, filling out the
forms. These latter consumers are typically more sensitive to the terms of the deal and
many of them would not buy the product without the beneficial term. But there is an
important difference between SOTs and SBTs in this respect. As noted, suppliers might
use SOTs in order to fool uniformed consumers into buying a product under terms they
would not have accepted had they know about them. This is not the case with SBTs,
where even uniformed consumers buy what they aimed to buy, namely, the product
without the special benefit.
This also illuminates how SOTs and SBTs feature two different modes of price
discrimination. With SBTs all consumers know how much they are paying and what they
are receiving; by contrast, with SOTs only informed consumers have it right. This
difference bears on the potential profits a supplier could derive from each of these two
techniques. With an SBT, since uninformed consumers know of the high price they are
paying (say, a posted price of 11 in Example 4) they might refrain from buying the
supplier’s product. This is not the case with a SOT, in which uninformed consumers
mistakenly believe they are paying a relatively low price for a contract without the
oppressive term. Hence the supplier does not lose their business.
Finally, as with SOTs, the supplier can use SBTs to make the contract appear fair,
thereby immunizing it from both courts' and consumers' scrutiny. The supplier may have
wanted to use a TOT, but is well aware that a TOT could be struck down by courts as
unfair. To avoid this, in addition to the TOT, the supplier could incorporate an SBT into
the contract in order to set the stage for the argument that the contract is balanced and
fair. By using an SBT and not a beneficial term which applies to all consumers, the
supplier gains more: only some consumers receive the benefits, while the argument that
the contract is balanced and fair may still be accepted by courts. Thus, suppose that in
Example 4 there was a TOT, immunizing the supplier from liability for a delay of up to
90 days in delivery (as in Example 1). Such a TOT is at risk of invalidation by courts.
The supplier could argue, however, that because of the TOT he offered consumers a
special discount, in an SBT, which makes the price lower than that of his competitors. As
explained, this strategy could protect the supplier from courts' and others’ scrutiny, even
though most consumers, being uninformed, would pay the full price and bear the costs of
the oppressive clause.
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3. Welfare Concerns
From a social welfare perspective, SBTs are less problematic than TOTs or SOTs.
As noted, TOTs and SOTs present a "bad surprise"52 for uninformed consumers. This is
not the case with SBTs, in which uninformed consumers receive what they expected to
get. Unlike TOTs and SOTs, SBTs cannot cause consumers to buy products they do not
really want. This implies that TOTs and SOTs possess greater potential for inefficiencies.
The efficiency implications of an SBT depend on the social outcome of the price
discrimination it allows, which is generally ambiguous. On the one hand, the SBT
effectively reduces the price paid by informed consumers and this could induce such
consumers to buy the product. That is, an SBT features the social advantage of “bringing
consumers on board.” This effect promotes social welfare.53 On the other hand, the price
uninformed consumers pay under an SBT is typically higher than the price consumers
would pay absent such price discrimination. This could cause some uninformed
consumers not to buy the product. Accordingly, SBTs also feature “inefficient noncontracting” – they could cause efficient transactions not to take place. The latter effect
has a negative effect on social welfare.54 Furthermore, as we show elsewhere, SBTs could
hinder competition in certain cases, by making tacit or explicit collusion between
competitors more likely.55
From a fairness perspective, SBTs are much less problematic – if at all – than TOTs
and SOTs: consumers are not deceived by suppliers, since they receive what they
expected to get. The situation could be different where there is a special relationship
between the supplier and the consumer. At times, a special relationship warrants the
recognition of a duty on the part of the supplier to explicitly disclose to consumers the
existence of an SBT in his standard form contracts.56 SBTs could also create a
distributional justice concern, since they create inequality among consumers. Still, as

52

An important criterion for courts' intervention in consumer contracts is whether the arguably
problematic terms posed a bad surprise for the consumer. See infra note 108.
53
See TIROLE, supra note 41, at 137-142 (" … [A] necessary condition for price discrimination to be
preferred socially is that it raise total output … ."); HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS Vol. 2 1089 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) ("price discrimination generates greater seller profits yet
may well be benign or even favorable on average for consumers.").
54
Supra Section I.B.3.
55
See Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 1025-29.
56
See, e.g. United States use of Bussen Quarries, Inc. v. Thomas, 938 F.2d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 1991)
("The duty to disclose may arise from inequality of position, a fiduciary relationship between the parties, or
a demonstration of superior knowledge on the part of one party that is not within the fair and reasonable
reach of the other party."); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Little Rock,
Ark., 774 F.2d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The duty to speak may be based on special circumstances, such
as a confidential relationship, in which one party knows that another is relying on a misrepresentation to his
detriment.").
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with SOTs, in the case of SBTs consumers who enjoy better deals are often the less
wealthy ones. This helps alleviate, or even remove, distributive justice concerns.57
In Part II we show how competition over contracts cannot really be trusted to remove
SBTs.
D. Complexity
1. The Technique
The fourth and final oppressive technique often used by suppliers is artificial
complication of the contract. The next example is illustrative.
Example 5. Combined Internet and Multichannel TV Plans. An Internet provider who
also supplies multichannel TV offers a menu of plans: each plan is different than the
others with regard to general monthly fee, fee per special channels or group of channels,
pay per view, video on demand services, band width, modes of payment, and all of the
permutations among the above parameters, in ways that make it difficult for a consumer
to evaluate the plans.

There are numerous examples where there is good reason to suspect complication of
contracts of being artificial. Contracts with cellular phone companies58, with credit card
firms59 for mortgages,60 and for car rentals61 are common examples.
2. Suppliers' Possible Motivations
The complexity of the provider’s contracts in Example 5 creates a distinction among
consumers similar to that of SOTs or SBTs. It is often the case that consumers who better
understand these complexities, and hence could opt for the best deals, are the same
consumers who delve into a supplier’s fine print to avoid SOTs or to look for SBTs.
Other consumers, because they find the transaction costs of understanding complex
contracts prohibitively high, might get a poorer deal. Accordingly, complexity, like SBTs
and SOTs, can serve as a tool for price discrimination in favor of the better informed
group of consumers.
In addition to price discrimination, artificially complicated contracts could benefit
the supplier in other ways. In particular, complicating contracts is sometimes necessary
for the success of the other oppressive techniques used by suppliers. TOTs, SOTs and
57

Supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Several websites offer comprehensive comparisons between cellular phone companies, and cellular
plans. See, e.g., http://www.cellphones.ca/cell-plans; http://www.myrateplan.com.
59
For a comparison between the different packages offered by various credit card firms see
http://www.creditcards.com.
60
See Bar-Gill, supra note 12.
61
See Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting" for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 903 (2006) (describing the
complexity of car rental contracts).
58
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SBTs are typically hidden in the fine print and their effectiveness often depends on
consumers’ difficulties in locating and understanding them. The degree of the contract's
complexity affects the quantity of uninformed consumers. The level of the contract’s
artificial complexity therefore depends on how many consumers the supplier wishes to
keep uninformed. If the supplier wishes to exploit uninformed consumers as much as
possible with a TOT or SOT, he will probably artificially make his contracts particularly
complex. If he wishes to allow some consumers to enjoy a special benefit (as with an
SBT) the artificial complexity of his contracts will probably be more moderate.
3. Welfare Concerns
Complexity used to hide a TOT or a SOT could extract value from uninformed
consumers and also induce some of them to buy products they would not have bought but
for the complex nature of the contract. Hence artificial complexity, in such cases, could
feature inefficiencies (inefficient allocation of risks, inefficient contracting (by
uninformed consumers), inefficient non-contracting (by informed consumers)), as well as
unfairness and distributive justice concerns similar to those created by TOTs and SOTs.
Complexity not used to hide TOTs or SOTs (i.e., complexity per se), could create
price discrimination, the efficiency of which is ambiguous (as with SBTs the upside of
such discrimination is bringing consumers on board but the downside is inefficient noncontracting.) In addition, such complexity could create inefficient contracting. That is,
complexity per se could lure consumers to enter contracts they would not have entered
had they been informed. To illustrate, in Example 5, where uninformed consumers cannot
really pick the package of multi-channel TV and Internet services most suitable to their
needs, they may well find themselves with an unsuitable package which they would never
have chosen had they understood the contract.
Price discrimination enabled by complexity per se also raises distributive justice
issues, but they are less of a concern to the extent that consumers discriminated against
are the rich. Contract complexity could also stifle competition in the market, as it makes
it harder for consumers to compare among competing suppliers.62 This makes suppliers
less likely to try to compete for consumers.63 Note that as in the case of SOTs, socially

62

Indeed, Bruce Cran, president of the Consumers Association of Canada, was quoted last summer as
saying that "They (wireless carriers) deliberately make it very difficult to make comparisons," See Gillian
Shaw, iPhone Data Pricing Draws Fire; 35¢ for Brief email. Bell Mobility Might Feed Off Backlash, THE
GAZETTE, July 9, 2008, at B5. In the same vein, Natalie Woodroofe, spokesman for UK credit card issuer
Nationwide, said that: "In the current market, it is very difficult for British consumers to make an informed
choice. There are 1,300 credit card brands available in the UK, offering a range of different rates, fees and
complex terms and conditions." See Nina Montagu-Smith, Lay Cards on The Table, Nationwide Tells
Rivals Building Society Wants Clarity on Fees, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Nov. 1, 2002,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/borrowing/creditcards/2832161/Lay-cards-on-thetable-Nationwide-tells-rivals.html.
63
See Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 997-8; Bar-Gill, supra note 12 at 1102-6.
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harmful complexity would not disappear even if many informed consumers existed,
because informed consumers are not particularly harmed by complexity.
As shown in Part II, competition would often have a negligible deterrent effect
against artificial complexity of standard form contracts. Hence this technique, like SOTs,
should be strictly scrutinized by courts.

E. Summary
The following table summarizes the welfare concerns stemming from the four
oppressive techniques.
TABLE 1: WELFARE CONCERNS FROM THE OPPRESSIVE TECHNIQUES

TOT

Inefficient
Allocation of Risks
yes

SOT

yes (non-informed)

SBT

no

Complex

yes (non-informed)

Inefficient
Contracting
yes (noninformed)
yes (noninformed)
no
yes (noninformed)

Inefficient NonContracting
yes (informed)

Efficiently Bringing
Consumers on Board
no

no

yes

yes

yes (noninformed)
yes (noninformed)

yes

no

yes

yes

Unfair
yes

II. COMPETITION OVER CONTRACTS AND THE INFORMATION GAP
In Part I, we presented four oppressive techniques used by suppliers in standard form
contracts. We explored suppliers' possible motivations in employing these techniques and
discussed the possible policy concerns stemming from each technique. In Part I, we
purposely ignored the impact of competition. In the current part of the Article we
introduce competition into the discussion. We explore to what extent competition over
contracts can contribute to closing the gap of information between suppliers and their
uninformed consumers. This is a crucial question because the oppressive techniques
could not be inefficient or unfair without an information gap. Hence competition’s ability
to close the information gap should be a central consideration in evaluating whether a
particular oppressive technique is efficient and fair, and, accordingly, whether it warrants
the court’s intervention in the standard form contract.
Of course, for competition over contracts to exist, competition over price, or at least
over quality, must be shown to exist. For example, if a supplier who uses a TOT is a
monopolist – the only supplier in his market – his product or service faces no
competition, so there is no competition with regard to his contract either. Competition
could also be lacking altogether when there are only a few suppliers in the market (an
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oligopolistic market) and the market is susceptible to collusion.64 In a market prone to
tacit or explicit collusion, suppliers might collude also over the imposition of oppressive
terms. In what follows, we assume that the supplier’s market is competitive enough to
foster competition over price and quality, and we focus on the question whether and
when competition over contracts exists.
Competition over contracts can inform consumers who were previously
uninformed.65 When consumers are informed, suppliers would not want to place
inefficient terms in their fine print.66 The same is true when consumers are uninformed,
but there is a credible threat of competition over contracts, which could inform them.
This would suffice to deter suppliers from hiding inefficient or unfair terms in their
standard form contracts. Hence competition over contracts, in our framework, involves
suppliers’ credible threats to actively expose each other’s oppressive techniques, thereby
informing uninformed consumers.67 After all, if suppliers have already exhausted price
and quality competition, and a supplier wishes to raise its market share at the expense of
other suppliers, he may wish to find hidden flaws in his rival’s contracts and make them
salient to consumers. As we shall see below, however, this particular form of competition
does not always exist.
A. How Can Competition over Contracts Close the Information Gap?
Suppose the market in which a supplier operates is competitive. How can
competition the supplier faces help inform consumers about the supplier’s oppressive
techniques, thereby deterring the supplier from employing inefficient and unfair terms in
his contract? In this section we answer this question. In sum, it all depends on whether
competitive tension among rivals in the market triggers not only competition over price
or quality, but also competition over contracts; only then, suppliers would be effectively
deterred from using inefficient and unfair techniques in their standard form contracts.
In the meantime, we purposely ignore special factors, explored in detail in section B
below, which could stand in the way of competition closing the information gap. In the
current section we show that even before considering these special factors the effects of
competition on the information gap crucially depend on the type of oppressive technique
64

See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note, 41 at 240, 247-51 (showing when competitors could collude, even
tacitly, and what market conditions foster such behavior); See also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990) 235-75 (same).
65
See supra note 9. Ezra Friedman, Competition and Unconscionability ((May 2009) (unpublished
paper presented at Am. L. & Econ. Ass’n, on file with authors) claims that a more competitive market may
be more prone to exploitation, because firms then earn less money on informed consumers than in a noncompetitive market. He takes the naiveness of consumers as given, however. In our framework, in a
competitive market, suppliers may want to steal market share by educating consumers.
66
See supra note 20.
67
Absent such competition, standard-form contracts could be regulated to make their terms more salient.
Cf. Mann, supra note 57, at 927-32 (proposing to foster competition among credit card issuers, by
standardization of most of the terms offered to consumers).
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used by the supplier. Let us examine these effects separately for each of the four
oppressive techniques.
1. Traditional Oppressive Terms
Consider a supplier (“Supplier X”) employing the TOT described in Example 1: His
standard form contract contains a provision, in the fine print, according to which "the
supplier bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to 90 days." But now suppose that
the supplier is not the only one in his market, but rather faces intense competition from
several rival suppliers who sell TV sets too. Intense competition means that if a supplier
is offering consumers either a relatively high price or a relatively poor deal, competing
suppliers can and will offer better deals and/or lower prices.68 But if consumers remain in
the dark as to Supplier X's TOT hidden in the fine print, simply offering them a deal
without such a TOT would not suffice in order to persuade them to switch to a competing
supplier. Hence competing suppliers would often want to let consumers know about
Supplier X’s hidden TOT, in order to entice them away from Supplier X.69 This is a
simple case where competition could close the information gap between Supplier X and
his consumers.
At times, consumers might learn of a supplier’s inefficient or unfair TOT from
sources other than the supplier’s rivals. In particular, consumer-oriented web sites could
provide some information regarding oppressive terms in consumer contracts in certain
industries.70 In appropriate cases, where an industry is under close scrutiny of reliable
watchdogs that are committed to protect consumers, a supplier could claim that the threat

68

By "intense competition" we do not necessarily mean competition that drives prices all the way down
to marginal cost (the cost of supplying the marginal unit). We acknowledge that in real life, in most
markets competition is not that perfect. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY
R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 387-400 (1995); TIROLE, supra note 41, at 209-236. Subject to this
caveat, we assume that competition is intense enough to induce suppliers to try and fight each other for
market share. In other words, we assume that competitive tension is too intense to sustain tacit or express
collusion among suppliers.
69
For examples of such behavior, see infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
70
For example, ConsumerReports.org reported a survey of contracts regarding extended warranties for
cars, and recommended that consumers pay attention to “exclusions and limitations” in the fine print,
stressing that in order to learn about them, “you need to delve into the contract.” See
http://www.consumerreports.org:80/cro/cars/new-cars/buying-advice/extended-warranties-4-08/how-theywork/how-they-work-continued/extended-warranties-how-they-work-terms-and-coverage.htm. See also
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of 'Opportunity to Read' in Contract, 4 EUR. REV. OF CONT. L. 428 (2008)
(Proposing non-legal approaches to making the contract terms more transparent, by building on market
devices such as ratings and labeling). In addition, independent bloggers or industry analysts occasionally
highlight the existence of harsh terms in the fine print of particular suppliers. For example, Telecom
Analyst Bruce Kushnick has revealed allegedly oppressive terms in the fine print regarding the use of
iPhones.
See
What’s
Hidden
in
iphone’s
Fine
Print?,
July
9,
2007,
http://directorblue.blogspot.com/2007/07/whats-hidden-in-iphones-fine-print.html;
See
also
http://www.newnetworks.com/attwirelessfineprint.htm; Also, blogger Ken Fisher has alleged that a term in
AT&T’s contract for Internet connection is oppressive. See infra note 92.
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of such exposure would suffice in order to deter him from including inefficient or unfair
TOTs in his contracts, much like competition over contracts would.
There are various examples of firms criticizing terms hidden in the fine print of their
rivals’ contracts: To give only a few, in its commercials Capital One, a rewards credit
card firm, mocks competing reward credit card companies, for hiding various limitations
to receiving rewards in their fine print, such as minimum card use requirements,
expiration and inalienability provisions, as well as blackout dates during which rewards
cannot be used.71 Nationwide, a provider of loans, mortgages and credit cards, has
emphasized that its rivals’ fine print contains "hidden features" such as the paying off of
the cheapest debt first and stressed in an Internet publication, that "We think that is
unfair, so we allow customers to pay off the most expensive debt first."72 In a TV
commercial, Nationwide highlights how its rivals in the mortgage market hide an "HLC,"
or "Higher Lending Charge" in their contract that kicks in when the amount borrowed
exceeds a given percentage of the value of the property.73 Broadband Internet Service
Provider PlusNet criticized its competitors, and specifically its rival Tiscali, for
misleading customers into believing they had “unlimited connectivity,” whereas the fine
print of their standard form contracts includes a "fair usage" clause that is designed to
ease congestion at peak traffic times but effectively serves as a cap on connectivity.74
Cheap TV Spots, a company which offers TV advertising for small businesses, attacked
the oppressive fine print of its rivals that sell automated ads.75 Wireless carrier Alltel
broadcast a TV commercial criticizing rivals AT&T, T-Mobile, Sprint and Verizon (the
companies’ representatives each wear a T-shirt with the name of the competing carrier
marked on it) for their fine print preventing customers from changing their wireless plan
without extending their contract.76 Virgin Mobile too has extensively published critiques
71

See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFn4cxy05HA (Capital One commercial in which reward
limitations are allegorized through a princess kissing a frog and receiving a rat instead, who quotes the fine
print); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kxpx4HnPcTs (Capital One commercial where limitations are
allegorized through a tooth fairy quoting the fine print explaining why a child receives merely a nickel for
her tooth); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WAGJkRh8rXA (Capital One commercial implicitly
comparing rival’s fine print to living Hell while Capital One causes Hell to freeze out with the slogan
“Capital One: takes all of the surprises out of reward mile redemption … no hidden fees, no expiration, no
blackouts.”
72
See Nina Montagu-Smith, supra note 62.
73
See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Lgbs6A2glk&feature=related (Nationwide commercial
featuring a couple, frustrated by the provision while the rival bank’s representative tries to distract them);
For a definition of an HLC, see http://www.home.co.uk/guides/mortgage_glossary.htm?hlc; See also
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFZV3y-p_NY (another Nationwide commercial criticizing rivals for
first offering low introductory rates so as to “hoike people in” and then exploit them with larger hidden
fees.)
74
See David Meyer, PlusNet Accuses Broadband Rivals of Misleading Customers, ZDNET.CO.UK, Sept.
1 2006, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/0,1000000085,39282114,00.htm.
75
See http://cheaptvcommercial.com/ (Cheap TV Spots Internet ad calling consumers who choose rivals
“suckers” due to rivals’ oppressive fine print).
76
See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E1h0KaaOkFM. Following Alltel’s campaign, Verizon
Wireless and Sprint Nextel announced that they too would alter their contracts to enable customers to
switch plans without extending the contract’s period. See Matt Kapko, VZW Sues Alltel over Ad Claims;
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about its rivals’ fine print, including “hidden fees,”77 charging for services the customer
does not need,78 as well as lock-in periods.79
2. Selectively Oppressive Terms
Consider now the SOT of Example 3 above, where Supplier X’s standard form
contract provides that "the supplier bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to 90
days, unless the consumer asks otherwise at the time of purchase and fills out the
requisite forms." Suppose now that Supplier X faces intense competition from other TV
suppliers. To what extent would other suppliers, who vigorously compete with Supplier
X, have the incentive to inform consumers about Supplier X’s SOT? Unlike the case of a
TOT, with a SOT, Supplier X’s informed consumers, who have no particular problem
carefully reading the fine print and filling out the forms, are not subject to the oppressive
term. Where the transaction costs required from informed consumers to escape the
oppressive term are negligible, competing suppliers could not entice such informed
consumers away from Supplier X by highlighting the existence of the SOT. A competing
supplier could allegedly only steal Supplier X’s potential uninformed consumers – those
who are subject to the oppressive term. But when a competing supplier reveals the
existence of the SOT to them, even they may well buy Supplier X’s product, now that
they know from the competing supplier how to easily relieve themselves from Supplier
X’s oppressive term. Hence competing suppliers might be unsure how many consumers

Fight Centers on Ability to Change Plans without Impacting Contracts, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Jan. 7,
2008, at 4. See also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgnSgW-xz3c (where another Alltel commercial
highlights how customers of its four rivals (represented again by these four representatives) are “stuck”
with contracts that do not match their individual needs).
77
See Maryanna Lewyckyj, Cellphone Fee Furor; System Access Charges Subject of Lawsuit, THE
TORONTO SUN, March 5, 2005, at 48. (Founder of Virgin Mobile quoted saying that his rival cellular
carriers
have
been
hiding
fees
in
their
fine
print.);
See
also
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sWMsZLk0mfc (a news bulletin describing the PR strategy behind the
launching of Virgin Mobile, featuring “Nothing to Hide,” “no contracts” and “no hidden fees.”.); Also, Bell
Mobility, a Canadian rival of Rogers, the network associated with iPhones, has broadcast a commercial
criticizing the fees hidden in rivals’ contracts. The ad features customers of rival cell phone companies as
victims of a crime. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lS4QMYZhcI8. Indeed, the Canadian network
associated with iPhone has been reported as using oppressive and unfair techniques in its fine print, and
Bell Mobility was named by reporters as the carrier most likely to feed off the exposure of Rogers'
behavior. See Gillian Shaw, supra note 62.
78
See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4aNgTXjf5c. (A Virgin Mobile commercial entitled “Don’t
Get Hosed”).
79
See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZW8VlnGgQQ. (A Virgin Mobile ad entitled “don’t get
sucked in”); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfjczPVyddI. (Ad with the slogan “Had enough? Get
Virgin Mobile. No ripoffs, no lock-ins."); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0jMAu45vas. (Virgin
Mobile commercial criticizing “the mobile phone companies that tempt you with the so called ‘free
phones,’ they don’t explain all the costs … “.). Several additional examples of firms criticizing their rivals’
fine print exist on file with authors.
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they could really steal from Supplier X by closing the consumers' information gap, and
this lack of certainty could stifle their incentive to do so.80
Accordingly competition has a weak deterrent effect on Supplier X's incentive to
include an inefficient or unfair SOT in his contract.81
3. Selectively Beneficial Terms
Will suppliers want to make their rivals’ SBTs salient to consumers? Suppose
Supplier X adopts the SBT mentioned in Example 4: His fine print provides a special
discount for consumers who fill out a certain form and mail it back to the supplier. Will
competing suppliers, engaged in vigorous competition with Supplier X, have an incentive
to highlight to consumers the existence of Supplier X’s SBT? The analysis here is similar
to that of SOTs: First, the competing supplier would not necessarily succeed in enticing
Supplier X’s informed consumers away, since they already enjoy the special discount
from Supplier X. Second, the rival supplier might not even be able to entice uninformed
consumers away from Supplier X, since the latter, following the rival’s advertisement
about Supplier X’s SBT, might simply choose Supplier X’s product and fill out the
requisite forms.82 As in the case of SOTs, then, there are no substantial benefits from
exposing a rival’s SBT.83
80

The situation could be different when the transaction costs required in order to neutralize the
oppressive term are non-negligible. If, for example, filling out the forms in Example 3 is time consuming, a
competing supplier could steal more of Supplier X’s consumers by highlighting that when buying his TVs,
no oppressive terms exist, with no need for time consuming filling-out of forms.
81
See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 9 (showing that competition cannot deter suppliers from using
avoidable add-ons, that were shown above to resemble SOTs). To be sure, at times competing suppliers
could derive certain long-term benefits from closing consumers' information gaps as to Supplier X's SOT.
First, if for some reason the rival supplier is not able to discriminate in favor of informed consumers (as the
SOT enables Supplier X to do) the rival may want to expose the SOT in order to erode Supplier X’s ability
to discriminate. Second, emphasizing the existence of Supplier X’s SOT to consumers could erode Supplier
X’s profits, leaving him fewer funds to invest in improving his product. Still, these subtle long-run
competitive motivations could not be counted upon to guarantee the rival’s incentives to expose the SOT.
Criticizing SOTs might become more likely where the SOT binds the consumer to his supplier and makes it
hard for her to switch to a competing supplier. For example, UK telecom company British Telecom has
criticized its rival, TalkTalk, alleging that its "customer agreements are unfair because they include a
'negative opt-out term' which allows TalkTalk to move customers [to its own network] without their
permission." A British Telecom executive was quoted as saying that "[t]hese clauses are unfair on
customers and are a shady practice. I am surprised they would ever be considered by a major industry
operator." The criticized term is a SOT, since, according to TalkTalk’s contract, a consumer can ask, in
writing, to disqualify TalkTalk from unilaterally moving his telephone line to TalkTalk’s network. See
Damian Reece, BT Accuses Talktalk of Shady Sales Practice, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 26, 2005, at 49.
Finally, when third impartial parties, such as consumer-oriented web sites, closely scrutinize the supplier’s
market, such parties could also deter suppliers from using inefficient or unfair SOTs. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
82
As with SOTs, a rival supplier could try to attract consumers by showing them they can receive the
same special discount with a smaller hassle. He could lure informed consumers from Supplier X if the
transaction costs consumers need to bear for receiving the discount from Supplier X are significant.
83
Edlin, supra note 49, at 538 shows how entry into the market does not alleviate the price-increasing
effect of price matching policies. Price matching (promising to match a rival’s lower price) bears some
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4. Complexity
Suppose now that Supplier X is the provider of multichannel TV and Internet
mentioned in Example 5, who offers complex contracts, the value of which is hard for
consumers to assess. Can a rival of Supplier X gain from closing the consumers’
information gap caused by this complexity? The answer depends on what Supplier X is
trying to accomplish by using complexity. Naturally, if complexity is used to disguise a
TOT, rival suppliers may want to help consumers see through the complexity and realize
the existence of Supplier X’s TOT. As in the case of highlighting the existence of any
TOT, the rival supplier could, in this way, steal consumers from Supplier X.
Suppose now, on the other hand, that Supplier X’s complexity is not used to hide a
TOT but rather to facilitate discrimination by Supplier X, or to facilitate the application
of SOTs or SBTs. Here rival suppliers’ incentives to neutralize the complexity and
emphasize this fact could be weaker. Supplier X’s informed and sophisticated consumers
may well be satisfied with Supplier X, since they know their way through Supplier X’s
contractual maze. Furthermore, they may be subsidized by Supplier X’s uninformed and
less sophisticated consumers, who end up with worse deals.84
B. Factors Preventing Competition from Closing the Information Gap
As we saw in the previous section, competition has the potential of closing the
information gap between suppliers and consumers mainly when suppliers use TOTs.
With the other oppressive techniques competition over contracts is expected to be minor
or non-existent. In this section we discuss several factors that may prevent competition
from closing the information gap even with respect to TOTs. Each of these factors could
cause suppliers not to inform consumers about the TOTs used by their rivals.
1. Backfiring Competition
One reason suppliers might avoid criticizing their rivals' oppressive techniques is that
by doing so they would expose themselves to consumers' negative reactions toward their

resemblance to SBTs, since it too enables suppliers to discriminate between informed and uninformed
consumers. As in the case of SOTs, discussed supra note 81, in certain cases there could be long-run, more
subtle profits derived by a competing supplier from highlighting Supplier X’s SBT. Such subtle
competitive drives cannot be counted upon, however, to close the information gap. Also, when third
impartial parties, such as consumer-oriented web sites, closely scrutinize the supplier’s market, such parties
could deter suppliers from using inefficient or unfair SBTs. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
84
To be sure, if a rival supplier offers consumers a simple deal with terms equivalent to those informed
consumers could receive from Supplier X, they may nevertheless switch to the rival supplier, so as to
relieve themselves from the transaction costs. Also, in certain circumstances, rivals may have long-run
incentives to dissipate Supplier X’s ability to discriminate (via complexity) or his ability to make profits in
this fashion. See supra note 81. Finally, when impartial parties, such as consumer-oriented web sites,
closely scrutinize the supplier’s market, such parties could simplify complex contracts for the benefit of
consumers. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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own products (consumers’ backfiring on product)85 or contracts (consumers’ backfiring
on contract) or to rivals’ retaliation (rivals’ backfiring). To illustrate, suppose that in
Example 2 (the Dry Cleaner) the TOT limiting the Dry Cleaner's liability for damage to
the customer’s clothes was adopted by Dry Cleaner X and is inefficient. Dry Cleaner X’s
competitors are therefore supposedly expected to expose the TOT and make consumers
understand its drawback: a high risk of exposure to non-recoverable losses. But despite
the existence of intense competition in Dry Cleaner X’s market, competing dry cleaners
may avoid exposing the TOT and its adverse effect on consumers, because this exposition
may backfire on them. Consumers’ backfiring on the product occurs because by
illuminating Dry Cleaner X’s TOT a rival supplier may create the impression in
consumers' minds that dry cleaning as such may result in harm to consumers’ clothes.
Absent such exposition by rival dry cleaners, the possibility of damage to their clothes (as
the existence of the TOT itself) may not have been salient to consumers.86 Once
consumers become aware of the possible harm, their consumption of dry cleaning
services, including the services of the criticizing dry cleaner, may go down.
The second type of backfiring, consumers’ backfiring on the contract, can occur
because when a rival dry cleaner exposes Dry Cleaner X’s TOT this sharpens the
consumers' attention and increases their aversion toward exclusionary clauses used by dry
cleaners in general, including the criticizing dry cleaner’s exclusionary clauses. That is, if
a dry cleaner criticizes Dry Cleaner X’s exclusionary clause, he too would probably have
to stop using exclusionary clauses, since due to his campaign against Dry Cleaner X’s
oppressive clauses, consumers would become more sensitive to such clauses.87
The third type of backfiring, rivals’ backfiring, takes place because when Supplier
X’s TOT is criticized by a competing supplier, Supplier X is usually expected to retaliate.
By definition, criticizing a rival’s contract involves “negative advertising.” That is, rather
than praising his own product, a supplier has something bad to say or imply about his
rival’s contracts with consumers. Such negative advertising could be costly to the
criticizing supplier, because it usually invites retaliation by the criticized supplier.88
85

See supra note 13.
See Korobkin, supra note 22, at 1229-1230 (“For a product’s attribute to be salient to buyers, the
attribute must capture the limited attention of those buyers.”).
87
Consumers’ backfiring on the product and on the contract are stronger the longer suppliers expect to
operate in the market. When such backfiring occurs, its damage is usually long lived. If a rival supplier has
a TOT similar to Supplier X’s TOT and this supplier criticizes Supplier X’s TOT, the criticizing supplier
would probably need to stop using such a TOT for an indefinite period. Similarly, if such criticism reduces
the demand for the product, the reduction in demand could last for a considerable period.
88
See Ming-Jer Chen & Danny Miller, Competitive Attack, Retaliation and Performance: An
Expectancy-Valence Framework, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 85, 86 (1994) ("If a firm's actions represent a
threat that is obvious, easy to match, and significant, its alert rivals will be motivated to counter that attack,
and thus perhaps, to negate its potential benefits"). Retaliation could be a rational strategy if the criticized
supplier wishes to show consumers that he is not worse than the criticizing supplier and/or when the
criticized supplier wishes to win back market share enticed away from him by the criticizing supplier. Chen
and Miller, id. at 88, claim that "[a]n action is more likely to evoke a response if it is easy to imitate, that is,
if it can be countered simply, economically and without much organizational disruption… .".
86
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Retaliation against the criticizing supplier is expected to be harsher the more severe the
critique.89
While the threat of consumer backfiring on the product varies from case to case, and
is at times compelling, suppliers’ fear of rivals’ backfiring always exists to a certain
extent. Furthermore, consumer backfiring on the contract exists whenever the criticizing
supplier himself employs oppressive techniques similar to the criticized one. In a market
in which competition over price and quality is strong, however, consumer backfiring on
the contract and rivals’ backfiring are not expected, in and of themselves, to stop
suppliers from criticizing their rivals’ TOTs. In general, any competitive move by a
supplier involves the need to become competitive himself (as in the case of consumer
backfiring on the contract) and involves, to a certain extent, retaliation by the suppliers’
rivals, who wish to compete back (as in the case of rivals’ backfiring). Nevertheless, in a
competitive market, these two forms of backfiring are usually presumed not to block
competition.
2. Attracting Unwanted Consumers
A supplier would hesitate to expose his rival’s oppressive terms if he expected many
of the consumers attracted by this exposition to be unwanted consumers.90 Unwanted
consumers are characterized by the fact that they are so costly to serve that, if possible, a
supplier would prefer not to serve them at all.
Unwanted consumers could typically exist in markets for services, long-term
contracts, sales of products with supplier warranties, and so forth, where consumers of
certain types are prohibitively costly to serve.91 To illustrate, consider the example given
in the introduction of a manufacturer of computers who employs a clause in his contracts
exonerating himself from liability for losses caused by some of the computer’s
components. Assume now that these components malfunction half of the time due to the
consumer’s carelessness. A rival computer supplier criticizing this TOT must take into
account that the first consumers the exposition of the TOT attracts are the careless
consumers whose expected losses are relatively high. For such consumers the TOT is
especially harmful. Naturally, the criticizing supplier could not employ a similar
89

Chen & Miller, id., examined the aviation industry in the United States and concluded that the more
visible, more central and more easily imitated attacks by criticizing firms provoke more responses from the
criticized.
90
See supra note 14.
91
Suppliers often try to get rid of high cost consumers. See, e.g., Alisa Bralove, Screening Clients Can
Prevent Attorneys from Taking on Problem Clients, THE DAILY RECORD, Aug. 15,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4183/is_20030815/ai_n10057488/pg_1 (quoting attorneys who
advise their colleagues on how to identify and get rid of unwanted clients); Lucy Barrett, How Admen Can
Spot
the
'Timewaster.com',
MARKETING
WEEK,
Nov.
4,
1999,
http://www.mad.co.uk/Main/News/Disciplines/Digital/Articles/7f1953a8adc1428e8de91dcf36c7a7dd/How
-admen-can-spot-the-'timewastercom'.html (reporting how London's top advertising agencies turn down
new Internet ventures due to their high insolvancy rate).
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exclusionary clause in his contract. Hence he may rightly fear that many of the
consumers he would entice away would be "high risk," and therefore "high cost,"
consumers. This would weaken his incentives to expose his rival’s TOT in the first place.
A similar effect could deter competitors from criticizing the Dry Cleaner's TOT in
Example 2. The first consumers to leave the Dry Cleaner after they become aware of the
TOT are those whose clothes are more vulnerable to damage or more expensive. A rival
dry cleaner who does not limit his liability might hesitate to entice away such consumers,
whose expected harm from dry-cleaning is on average relatively high.92
3. Benefit Externalization
As the preceding sections show, the criticizing supplier at times bears costs when he
exposes a rival’s oppressive technique, particularly due to backfiring of the three abovementioned types, and the attraction of unwanted consumers. At the same time, the
benefits of exposing a rival’s TOT could be shared by many of the other suppliers in the
market, particularly those who do not use similar TOTs themselves. Consumers
concerned with their supplier’s exposed TOT might well leave their supplier in favor of
another supplier who does not use such a TOT, and might not necessarily transfer to the
criticizing supplier. If the criticizing supplier bears all costs when criticizing his rival and
does not receive all of the benefits, his incentive to do so will be diminished.93 Moreover,
each of the suppliers who do not use TOTs may prefer to wait until another supplier
among them decides to bear the costs of criticizing their rival.94 Consequently, it may be
that none of them ends up engaging in such criticism.
4. Irresponsive Consumers
In order for competitive pressure to close the information gap between consumers
and a supplier, a large enough portion of consumers needs to be responsive to the
information the rival supplier is trying to convey to them.95 To be sure, not all consumers
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For another example, consider Internet access provider AT&T’s TOT, enabling it, at the time, to
“immediately terminate … your Service, any Member ID, electronic mail address, IP address, Universal
Resource Locator or domain name used by you, without notice, for conduct that AT&T believes… tends to
damage the name or reputation of AT&T, or its parents, affiliates and subsidiaries.” Naturally, no rival of
AT&T would wish to highlight the existence of this TOT, because the customers who care about such a
term and who would likely transfer to the criticizing rival would be those most inclined to harm the
reputation of their Internet provider. Fortunately, in this case the TOT has been revealed by a journalist. See
Ken Fisher, AT&T Vows to Use Terms of Service for Good, Not Censorship, Oct. 2, 2007,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071002-att-vows-to-use-terms-of-service-for-good-notcensorship.html.
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See supra note 15.
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To be sure, some of the costs created when a TOT is exposed are suffered by all rivals, and not only
by the criticizing supplier. Such are the costs involved in consumers’ backfiring on the product and on the
contract, and in attracting unwanted consumers. A disproportionate part of these costs, however, are born
by the criticizing supplier. The costs of rivals’ backfiring are born exclusively by the criticizing supplier.
95
See supra note 16.
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need to respond to such information. It is sufficient that a critical mass of them might
leave the supplier following the rival's advertisements in order to effectively deter the
supplier from employing the TOT. Such a critical mass of responsive consumers may not
exist, however. In certain cases, consumers are not only ignorant of the TOT hidden in
their contract, but also indifferent to advertising by rival suppliers who try to emphasize
its existence. After all, uninformed consumers are often those who are not willing to
expend the transaction costs needed in order to read the fine print in their contracts. They
may be equally unwilling to absorb and verify a rival supplier’s claim that their contract
is oppressive. Take the TOT of Example 1, for instance, in which Supplier X relieves
himself from liability for late delivery of a TV set. If a rival supplier advertises, in written
leaflets put in mailboxes or via Email, that Supplier X’s contract includes a TOT in the
fine print, consumers who do not read the fine print may also fail to read and absorb such
an advertisement. In order to induce them to respond, the rival supplier would have to
expend more resources in advertising. For example, he would have to emphasize Supplier
X’s TOT in television or radio commercials. But the latter form of advertisement is more
costly, and therefore could be less profitable for the criticizing supplier. The criticizing
supplier may well prefer to use the scarce and expensive advertising time he had
purchased to convey information consumers are more likely to respond to.
The situation might be different when suppliers use sales representatives who have
direct contact with consumers. Such sales representatives could try to convince
consumers to buy their company's product or service by exposing rival suppliers' TOTs
and emphasizing how the rivals' contract is unfair or draconian. Consumers' responses to
such efforts might at times be stronger, making the efforts worth their while.96 Also,
consumers might be more responsive in cases in which their deal with the supplier is a
larger one.97
C. Sufficiency of a Competitive Threat
As noted, for competition over contracts to deter suppliers from using inefficient or
unfair TOTs, rivals need not actually inform consumers about such TOTs. The threat that
rivals may do so often suffices in order to provide such deterrence.98 When a supplier
96

See Arvind Rangaswamy, Prbhakant Sinha & Andris Zoltners, An Integrated Model-Based Approach
for Sales Force Structuring, 9 MARKETING SCI. 279, 281 (1990) (examining the role of sales
representatives and pointing out that on the one hand, short purchase cycle and a competitive environment
support a constant presence of sales representatives. On the other hand, customers view the presence of
sales representatives as an inconvenience).
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See infra section III.B.1.c.
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It is well known that when a market is competitive enough, the mere threat of competition assures
competitive prices and good quality. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 41, at 101 (showing that in a competitive
market, product quality will be optimal from the point of view of the average consumer in equilibrium,
while a different level of quality would not evolve in equilibrium in the first place). This is why antitrust
courts and agencies approve or disapprove of a transaction, such as a merger among competitors, on the
basis of the number of viable competitors in the market. If the number and capacity of such rivals is large
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considers employing an inefficient or unfair TOT, he balances the gains such a TOT
might grant him with the expected losses from having rivals later criticize his TOTs.
Even if, say, only a 20% chance of rivals criticizing his TOT existed, such criticism
might involve such a large expected loss that it would outweigh the gains the supplier
expected to make from the TOT. This implies that even in cases where one or more of the
four factors discussed in the previous section partially hinders competition over
contracts, the probable threat of such competition could suffice to remove inefficient or
unfair TOTs.
It should be stressed that the supplier’s expected losses from rivals’ criticism is
typically long-lived. When its inefficient or unfair TOT is exposed, many consumers may
leave him in favor of rival suppliers. Even if the supplier stops using the TOT, consumers
might not trust him anymore.
III. HOW SHOULD COURTS HANDLE TRADITIONAL OPPRESSIVE TECHNIQUES?
In this part of the Article we propose to courts how to implement the market-based
approach and when to intervene in standard form consumer contracts based on our
conclusions from Parts I and II.
As demonstrated in Part II, competition over contracts serves as a weak deterrent
against the use of SOTs, SBTs and artificial complexity. Accordingly, these three
techniques deserve special scrutiny and courts should be particularly suspicious about
them. This result is striking, as to date courts have virtually ignored these techniques. Yet
as Part I shows, they potentially pose significant efficiency and fairness concerns. As we
show elsewhere,99 a host of legal tools exist to cope with the welfare concerns stemming
from SBTs. As to SOTs and artificial complexity, it would be worthwhile to explore how
the unconscionability doctrine could be applied to such practices and what other legal
tools might be available to mitigate their social harm.
Unlike in the cases of SOTs, SBTs and artificial complexity, where competition
cannot be counted upon to prevent their social harm, Part II shows how at times
competition—or even a threat of competition—could deter suppliers from using
inefficient or unfair TOTs. Part III provides courts with guidelines for applying the
proposed market-based approach to TOTs. We start by presenting courts' current
enough, the merger is approved, because the threat of competition is counted upon to produce competitive
prices and quality. See, e.g., Laura L. Stephens, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and Section 7 of The Clayton
Act: Closing An Antitrust Loophole, 75 B.U. L. REV. 477, 500 (1995) ("In analyzing mergers, economists
assume that market concentration and market performance (i.e., price competition) tend to vary
inversely."); Irving Bank Corporation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 845 F.2d 1035
(1988) (approving a merger among banks due to the low concentration of the market); Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission's 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Statement Accompanying
Release of Revised Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41, 552; 41,559 (Sept. 10, 1992), at section 1.51
(“Mergers resulting in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and
ordinarily require no further analysis.”).
99
See Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 1020-30.
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methodology for assessing TOTs. We then continue to propose how courts might
dramatically change their existing methodology by incorporating the insights of Part II
into the analysis of TOTs.100
A. Courts' Existing Attitude toward TOTs and the Proposed Change
Courts utilize various legal tools to deal with TOTs.101 At times, courts conclude that
TOTs have not been accepted by consumers in the first place and therefore are not part of
the contract.102 On other occasions, courts interpret TOTs in favor of consumers,
applying the rule of interpretation against the draftsman.103 Another way courts tackle
TOTs is to find them unenforceable under public policy considerations.104 At times,
courts impose liability for misleading advertising, when a supplier publicly advertises
only the beneficial, salient parts of his product, hiding the parts that make the supplier’s
real deal less attractive.105 But the most familiar tool courts employ in dealing with TOTs
is the doctrine of unconscionability.106 According to this doctrine, courts take into
account two types of unconscionability: procedural unconscionability and substantive
100

For a different approach advocating various degrees of market regulation see Baird, supra note 14, at
p. 947 (stating that "in mass markets in which there is little dickering or negotiating, legal rules should
focus … on ensuring the smooth operation of the market as a whole").
101
See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 456-60 (2002) (discussing various legal tools to handle harsh terms in standard form
contracts).
102
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 298-300 (1999) ("[a] judicial technique in
dealing with standard forms is to refuse to hold a party to a term on the ground that, although the writing
may plainly have been an offer, the term was not one that an uninitiated reader ought reasonably to have
understood to be part of the offer."); Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006)
(deciding that the franchisee did not agree to the arbitration clause, and thus it is not a part of the
agreement); C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 181 (Iowa 1975) (refusing to
enforce an escape clause in an insurance policy because "This escape clause…, was never read to or by
plaintiff's personnel, nor was the substance explained by defendant's agent").
103
See, e.g., United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 (1970) (applying the rule of interpretation
against the draftsman to a construction contract). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §206
("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is
generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing
otherwise proceeds.").
104
See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) ("Employing
'general contract law principles,' courts will refuse to enforce arbitration provisions that are
"unconscionable or contrary to public policy.").
105
See, e.g., Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 663 (2006) (affirming a summary
judgment imposing liability, since the defendant advertised its products as "Made in U.S.A.," although
components were manufactured outside the United States); Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 523 F.3d 934
(9th Cir. 2008) (ruling in favor of parents, who believed snacks for toddlers called "fruit juice snacks" were
healthy for their children, although the two most prominent ingredients were corn syrup and sugar).
106
UCC §2-302(1) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."); see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 151-177 (2000) (discussing the unconsionability doctrine);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 102, at 908 (same).
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unconscionability.107 Procedural unconscionability exists when consumers are
uninformed or when the supplier enjoys a superior bargaining position.108 In such cases,
consumers, as some courts have maintained, "do not have a meaningful choice."109
Substantive unconscionability relates to the harshness of the TOT: the more oppressive it
is the higher its chances of being struck down.110
Within procedural unconscionability courts often focus on whether the individual
consumer claiming the application of the doctrine was informed. For example, a
consumer who is not a native speaker of English might be considered uninformed and his
TOT would be condemned, while English speaking consumers subject to the same TOT
would be considered informed and their TOTs would remain valid.111 An extreme case of
substantive unconscionability is reflected in occasions in which a TOT is struck down
because of its very nature. A common example is an exclusionary clause relating to
personal injury, which is considered by the UCC as prima facie unconscionable.112 At
times, even exclusionary clauses concerning non-bodily harm, such as the one in
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See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code – The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485 (1967) (discussing both types of unconscionability and the interrelation between them);
Korobkin, supra note 15, at 1254 ("Courts usually search for 'substantive unconscionability' only when
there is evidence of a procedural defect in the bargaining process. Without evidence of ‘procedural
unconscionability', courts generally defer completely to seller-drafter terms."); Robert Hillman, Online
Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837,
854 (2006) (discussing the two forms of unconscionability).
108
See, e.g., Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2004)
(Procedural unconscionability is proven by showing "a lack of knowledge, lack of voluntariness,
inconspicuous print, the use of complex legalistic language, disparity in sophistication or bargaining power
of the parties and/or a lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about the contract terms.");
Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381-82 (Cal. App. 2001) ("Procedural
unconscionability analysis focuses on 'oppression' or 'surprise.'"); First Financial Ins. Co. v. Purolator
Secur., Inc., 69 Ill. App. 3d 413, 419 (1979) ("The unconscionability doctrine has been applied most often
to prevent instances of commercial sharp practices by parties possessing superior bargaining power.").
109
See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Circ. 1965)
("Unconsionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.");
Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 651 (2004) ("The oppression component arises
from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a
meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.").
110
See, e.g., Kinney v. UnitedHealth Care Services, Inc., 70 Cal. App. 1322, 1330 ("'Substantive
unconscionability' focuses on the terms of the agreement and whether those terms are so one-sided as to
‘shock the conscience.’); Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006) ("In other
words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable"); Abramson v.
Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 651 (2004) ("Substantively unconscionable terms may take
various forms, but may generally be described as unfairly one-sided.").
111
See, e.g., Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (holding that a contract was
unconscionable, since the defendant, because of his poor English, could not understand that he had waived
the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability.).
112
UCC §2-719(3) ("Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable…").
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Example 2 (The Dry Cleaner), may be considered unconscionable regardless of whether
consumers are informed or not.113
In addition to courts conducting case by case adjudication, legislatures in several
states have enacted laws prohibiting the use of certain types of TOTs. For example,
several states have banned suppliers from disclaiming implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability of the product or service.114 In many states, suppliers are subject to duties
of disclosure with respect to certain terms of the deal, including TOTs, thereby closing
the gap of information between them and consumers.115 At times suppliers are required
by legislators to clearly disclose to consumers whether they are providing them with a
limited or a full warranty, yet once the disclosure requirement is met suppliers are free to
provide a limited warranty.116
In sum, the brief description above suggests that courts take account of three main
considerations when deciding whether to strike down a TOT: to what extent consumers
are informed; the supplier's bargaining power vis a vis consumers; and the harshness of
the term in question. Yet it is hard to identify a clear and unified theory guiding courts
when dealing with TOTs.117
By contrast, the law and economics literature has shown that the main focus of courts
should be on procedural, rather than substantive unconscionability, and that even within
procedural unconscionability, only the information gap between suppliers and consumers
matters, rather than the supplier’s superior bargaining power.118 In particular, when
consumers are sufficiently informed, it is safe to assume that the policy concerns
discussed in Part I above are small, i.e., the TOT efficiently allocates risks, creates
efficient contracting, and does not entail inefficient non-contracting. Moreover, absent an
information gap, TOTs should also be presumed to be fair. The law and economics
literature’s conclusion, therefore, is that a TOT’s efficiency hinges solely on whether
consumers are sufficiently informed. The problem, however, is that it is hard to know
whether a large enough number of consumers is sufficiently informed. Moreover, even if
such an information gap is somehow proven to exist, that by itself, as we demonstrate,
does not mean that the TOT is inefficient. Accordingly, the focus on whether consumers
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UCC §2-719(3) ("Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable.").
114
See Farnsworth, supra note 102, at 318 (providing examples of statutes prohibiting disclaimers of
implied warranties).
115
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 70 (describing how legislatures impose duties of disclosure on suppliers,
and arguing that those endeavors are useless).
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See, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
2301-2312 (requiring a supplier who grants a written warranty to designate it as either a "full" or a
"limited" warranty).
117
See Mann, supra note 57, at 918-9 (arguing that courts that apply the unconscionability doctrine with
sufficient vigor "are likely to do a poor job of sorting provisions that make economic sense from those that
reflect overreaching.").
118
Supra Section I.A.2.
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are informed or not, demanded by the law and economics literature, to a large extent
leads to a dead end.
We propose a totally different methodology for assessing TOTs that circumvents this
problem: When applying the unconscionability doctrine, courts should look not directly
at whether an information gap exists, but rather at whether competition in the supplier’s
market is expected to close the information gap. The virtue of this new methodology is
that courts have useful tools to observe the strength of such competition, even when they
cannot assess whether there is an information gap.
Moreover, existing literature focusing on the question of whether consumers are
informed overlooks the fact that even the proven existence of an information gap is
insufficient to justify intervention, because the mere threat of competition, in a given
case, could incentivize suppliers to adopt only efficient and fair TOTs even when
consumers are uninformed. That is, even in markets in which suppliers have not actually
exposed each other’s TOTs, the mere threat of such competitive actions would deter
suppliers from employing TOTs that cause inefficiency or unfairness. On the other hand,
in cases where competition over contracts is not strong enough to close the information
gap, courts should be suspicious of TOTs and take a closer look at them.
In the next sections, we provide workable guidelines for courts regarding the
application of this new methodology.
B. Guidelines for Intervention under the Market-Based Method
In the case of TOTs, competition has the potential of closing the information gap
between suppliers and consumers. But the question of whether this potential will be
realized in a particular case depends on the type of the TOT or the transaction, and most
importantly, the characteristics of the supplier’s market. Naturally, before exploring the
degree of competition over contracts (the kind of competition that could close the
information gap), the court should examine how intense competition over price or quality
is. If the supplier is a monopolist, for example, the TOT should be assessed according to
the courts’ existing methodology.119 The same is true if the supplier operates in a market
with only a few firms, and, in addition, the court finds that the market is susceptible to
tacit or explicit collusive behavior.120 In such a case too, competition cannot be counted
upon to close the information gap, since suppliers in such a market lack sufficient
119

See Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d 241, 242, 242–45 (S.D. 1984) (striking
down a term because the seller was monopolistic).
120
In Henningsen v. Bloomsfield Motors, 32 N. J. 358, 391 (1960), for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in striking down Chrysler’s restrictive warranty, emphasized the fact that only three
manufacturers, including Chrysler, controlled over 90 percent of the passenger car market. Furthermore, the
TOT in question was actually drafted by the “Automobile Manufacturers Association” and hence could
have constituted explicit collusion (id. at 390); See also Lewis Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard
Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1169 (1976) (arguing that suppliers in concentrated markets may tacitly
collude on terms such as warranty coverage so as to facilitate an anticompetitive price).
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incentives to act so as to entice away customers from one another. This preliminary
examination of the degree of competition in the supplier’s market is similar to the way
federal courts deal with antitrust cases.121
Once the court finds that the supplier is not a monopolist in his market and that the
market is not susceptible to collusive behavior, it should examine whether competition
over contracts might be blocked in this market due to one or more of the four factors
discussed in Part II: backfire, unwanted consumers, externalization of benefits and
irresponsive consumers. In this section we propose a set of observable characteristics
which courts could look at, and through them determine to what extent the four factors
prevent suppliers from revealing TOTs in their rivals' contracts.122 As demonstrated, the
implementation of these insights provides several counterintuitive results.
If, after taking account of these characteristics, a court finds that competition over
contracts is able to close the information gap, it should not intervene against the TOT. If,
on the other hand, the court finds that competition over contracts is unable to close the
information gap, it should be particularly suspicious of the TOT: We propose that in such
a case, the burden of proof be transferred to the supplier to show that the TOT is
nevertheless efficient and fair. If this burden is not met, the court should intervene against
the TOT under the doctrine of unconscionability.
In what follows, we first consider observable characteristics related to the TOT or the
transaction itself that shed light on the expected intensity of competition over contracts.
These characteristics concern the type of TOT and the type of transaction rather than the
particular attributes of the parties involved. Then we portray observable characteristics
related to the market in which the supplier is operating.
1. The Type of TOT or Transaction
a. Does Exposing the TOT Reveal Information about the Product or Service?
Recall that consumers’ backfire on the product occurs only when criticizing the
oppressive technique reveals negative information as to the product or service sold by the
criticizing supplier. Such backfiring does not occur when the criticism reveals negative
121

See, e.g., United States v. CBS, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 832 (1978) (examining the commercial television
markets and its submarkets); New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, 926 F. Supp. 321 (1995) (examining the
implications of a merger in the market for breakfast cereals). See also Scherer & Ross, supra note 64, at
Ch. 7 (discussing the characteristics that make a market prone to tacit collusion); Tirole, supra note 41, at
Ch. 6 (same); Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission's 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
supra note 98, at section 2.1 (same); The merger guidelines also demonstrate how the market in which the
supplier operates needs to be defined. See id. at section 1.
122
An interesting question is whether competition over contracts could pressure suppliers into giving up
on efficient TOTs and not only on inefficient ones. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay
in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983) (arguing that the competitive outcome does not reflect
consumers' preferences, when they are unable to understand their contracts). Apparently, this could occur
only if such competition did not perfectly inform consumers. But even if that could happen, it should not
affect courts' decisions when they assess a TOT actually included in a contract.
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information only about the criticized supplier. To illustrate, in Example 1, where the TOT
relieves the supplier from liability for late delivery, exposing the TOT does not involve
negative information about TVs or their supply in general, but only negative information
about the supplier who employed this TOT. Furthermore, even when criticism about a
TOT seems to reveal negative information about the product or service, consumers’
backfire on the product is not always triggered. To illustrate, in Example 2 (The Dry
Cleaner) if the risk of damage to clothes from dry cleaning is already salient to
consumers anyway, or if a competing dry cleaner uses a different technology than Dry
Cleaner X in which there is hardly any risk to clothes, the competing dry cleaner would
hesitate less to expose Dry Cleaner X’s oppressive term. In such cases the information
implied by the criticism does not affect the demand for the criticizing supplier’s product
or service. On the other hand, if harm to clothes is a possibility at any dry cleaner’s
facility, and consumers are not aware of this possibility, a rival dry cleaner may hesitate
to criticize Dry Cleaner X’s TOT.
b. Effects of Exposing the TOT on High-cost Consumers
As we have explained, sometimes it is possible to predict which consumers would be
the first to leave their supplier if they were to be informed of his TOT. In Example 2 (The
Dry Cleaner) the first to leave are consumers whose clothes are expensive. These are
typically high cost consumers. Rival dry cleaners might find these consumers unattractive
and accordingly might avoid criticizing the TOT in the first place. This is typically the
case with many exclusionary clauses, which cap the supplier’s liability for harm. The first
consumers to leave the supplier when they become informed of the TOT are those who
pose the greatest risk of harm.
Another typical example of a TOT the exposing of which could attract high-cost
consumers is a TOT dealing with litigation over complications in the contract, such as
arbitration, jurisdiction and so forth.123 The first consumers to react to the exposition of
such a TOT in their contract are consumers who believe they will be more likely to be
involved in litigation with the supplier. These are typically high cost consumers. A
similar problem could exist with TOTs that improve the supplier’s ability to enforce the
consumer’s contractual obligations.124 When a rival exposes such a TOT, the first
consumers who would react and switch to the criticizing supplier are consumers who
believe they might not fulfill all of their contractual obligations. Obviously, these are
123

See, e.g., Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. (In re Am. Express
Mierchants' Litig.), 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 1646, 33-34 (2d Cir. N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009) (holding that a class
action waiver provision is "incompatible with the federal substantive law of arbitration."); Matterhorn, Inc.
v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866 (7th Cir., 1985) (denying a seller's motion to compel arbitration because the
buyer did not clearly intend to be bound by arbitration).
124
See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 106, at 163-167 ("Seller may also include a waiver of defense
clause, and if the sale is on secured credit, may include a clause that gives the seller a right to repossess if it
'deems itself insecure.'")
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unwanted consumers. These insights could justify courts’ relatively strict treatment of
TOTs dealing with exclusionary clauses, litigation or arbitration, or with suppliers’ tools
to enforce consumers’ obligations,125 but for reasons different than those currently given
by courts. Courts’ justifications for intervention in such cases hinge mainly on
“substantive unconscionability” i.e., the TOTs in question seem particularly one-sided,
draconian or harsh.126 We claim that the justification for intervention here is not the
harshness of the TOTs, but rather the fact that such TOTs are unlikely to be competed
away, due to rivals’ fear of attracting unwanted consumers.127
c. Scope of Transactions
When the transaction size is large, consumers are expected to be more responsive to
criticism of TOTs. For example, if instead of the TV sets in Example 1, Supplier X’s
TOT referred to the sale of a car, even consumers who had failed to read Supplier X’s
fine print might be alert to rivals’ ads exposing Supplier X’s TOT. Here rivals’ incentives
to engage in such criticism would be enhanced, because consumers would be more
responsive to their efforts.128
d. Does the TOT Qualify a Default Rule or a Contractual Benefit?
Our proposed market-based approach explains why a TOT qualifying a default rule
(such as an implied warranty) should be treated more strictly than a TOT qualifying a
benefit granted by the supplier himself (such as an express warranty). This can be
demonstrated through a variation of example 2 (the dry cleaner). Suppose that the dry
cleaner offers consumers, in the salient part of his contract, an express warranty covering
“any damage to cloths”. The TOT in question, in the fine print, qualifies the express
warranty and says that “cloths will be covered for damage not exceeding $50”. At first
blush, it seems that such a TOT should be treated strictly, since consumers who only read
125

Supra note 104.
See, e.g. Haprer v. Ultimo, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1402, 1410 (2003) ("if an arbitration clause does not
achieve 'minimum levels of integrity' it would 'be denied enforcement in any circumstances,' but all the
more so where it is in a contract of adhesion… That is, adhesion was not essential to a finding of
unconscionability."); Affholter v. Franklin County Water Dist., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106254 (2008)
(granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration since the arbitration provision was not substantively
unconscionable).
127
Another example, borrowed from Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 29, at 830-1, is a term in a contract
between a publisher and authors, according to which the publisher is allowed to publish the book, after the
time scheduled for authors' final approval of proofs, even if the authors have failed to meet the deadline for
approval. This example demonstrates Bebchuk & Posner's argument that one-sided terms in consumer
contracts allow selective enforcement by suppliers, which could be efficient. Id. We suggest that if the term
is inefficient, competition over contracts among publishers is unlikely to touch upon such a term, since
rival publishers understand that the first authors to leave the publisher using the one-sided term would be
those who expect to be late in approving their book's proofs.
128
Cf. Mann, supra note 57, at 900 (explaining consumers' inattentiveness to credit transactions by the
small size of the transactions).
126
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the salient part of the contract are deceived by the TOT. But if the supplier’s market is
competitive the conclusion could change, in light of the proposed market-based method.
Since the express warranty is offered in the salient part of the contract, it must mean that
backfiring on the product and attraction of unwanted customers are relatively weak: Had
they been strong, the supplier would not have wanted to highlight the existence of the
express warranty. Emphasizing that damage to cloths is covered informs consumers that
such damage is possible (possibly causing backfiring on the product) and could attract
high cost consumers (who particularly appreciate such a warranty). Hence when such an
express warranty exists, these two factors can be presumed to be insignificant. For the
same reason, rival suppliers would not be deterred from highlighting the existence of the
TOT qualifying the express warranty. They too will not fear from backfiring on the
product and attraction of unwanted consumers. The same is true for consumer
irresponsiveness: If the supplier makes an effort to make his warranty salient, this must
mean that such a warranty is important to consumers. Hence consumers are also expected
to be alert to rivals’ ads stressing that the warranty is actually qualified. Accordingly,
competition over contracts is relatively strong in this case (subject to benefit
externalization), and intervention is less justified.
Suppose now that the TOT qualifies an implied warranty, set in a default rule, rather
than qualifying an express warranty, granted by the supplier himself. In such a case,
backfiring on the product, attraction of unwanted consumers and consumer
irresponsiveness may well be strong, thereby stifling competition over contracts.
Therefore, such a TOT may deserve closer scrutiny than the TOT qualifying the express
warranty.129
2. Characteristics of the Supplier’s Market
a. Number of Suppliers in the Market Not Using the TOT
Suppose Supplier X is a dry cleaner in a certain area of New York City using a TOT
like the one in Example 2, capping his liability for damaged clothes. Imagine this TOT is
attacked in court. The court could often use the number of other suppliers in the market
(all dry cleaners in the above-mentioned area of New York City) not using a similar TOT
in order to assess the strength of the benefit externalization factor.130 If rival suppliers not
using a similar TOT are too numerous, a supplier who exposes Supplier X’s TOT may
fear that the benefits from such exposition would be shared by all suppliers not using the
129

The analysis could change in particular circumstances. For example, a computer supplier could have
an express warranty for “any damage or loss” and qualify it with a TOT saying that the warranty “does not
cover damage due to fire caused by a defect in the computer.” Here the express warranty itself could be too
general to cause backfiring on the product. Still rivals may hesitate to highlight the existence of the TOT,
so as not to inform consumers that defects in computers could cause fire.
130
To this end, the court needs to define the relevant market in which Dry Cleaner X operates, i.e.,
answer the question who are Dry Cleaner X’s rivals? This is a task routinely fulfilled by courts in antitrust
cases. See supra note 121.
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TOT: Consumers might leave Supplier X in favor of another supplier not using the TOT,
and not necessarily in favor of the criticizing supplier. Suppose, for example, that the
TOT is used only by Dry Cleaner X and is not used by five competing dry cleaners. Here
benefit externalization is particularly great and the chance that one of Supplier X’s five
rivals would want to expose X's TOT are slight.
This further implies that benefit externalization is smaller (and hence competition
over contracts is stronger) the more suppliers in the market use similar TOTs. This result
stands in stark contrast to courts’ and scholars’ conventional premise, according to which
if many or all suppliers in a market use an oppressive term, it has greater chances of
being stricken down.131 The analysis above shows that the contrary may be true: If most
suppliers use a similar TOT, and the market is competitive in other respects,132 benefit
externalization is small, and competition over contracts may well be strong. In such a
market, had the TOT been inefficient or unfair, any of the suppliers, and especially those
not using the TOT, may well have had a strong incentive to expose it (subject to the other
three factors that may hinder such incentives), since the benefits from such an exposition
would not be externalized. This could support a conclusion that the TOT is actually
efficient and fair, notwithstanding its harsh appearance.
Conversely, courts often treat a supplier’s TOT leniently when the consumer is
shown to have a choice of rival suppliers who do not use a similar TOT.133 But again, the

131

See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971) (quoting United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting)) ("The weaker party, in need of the
goods or services, is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author
of the standard contract has a monopoly or because all competitors use the same clauses."); Lloyd v.
Service Corp. of Ala., 453 So.2d 735, 739 (Ala. 1984) (same); Taylor v. Leedy and Co., 412 So. 2d 763,
766 (Ala. 1982) (striking down an expultatory clause in a lease because “almost all leases contain these
exculpatory clauses.”); See also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943) (“The weaker party, in need of goods and services, is
frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms … because all competitors used the same
clauses.”); ; Julian S. Lim, Comment: Tongue-Tied in the Market: The Relevance of Contract Law to
Racial-Language Minorities, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 616 (2003) (same); John P. Little, Note: Managed
Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating The Doctor-Patient Relationship And Endangering Patient
Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397 (1997) (“While MCOs compete with each other on price and benefits,
most MCOs employ standard form contracts with remarkably similar terms.”)
132
If there are only a few suppliers in the market, and it is prone to collusive behavior (supra notes 120121 and accompanying text) courts should be mindful of the concern that all or most suppliers in a market
use a similar TOT because suppliers are tacitly or expressly colluding. This was probably the case in
Henningsen, 32 N. J. at 391, where the market was extremely concentrated and the TOT had been dictated
by an association comprised of the suppliers (see supra note 120).
133
See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“ …
the ‘oppression’ factor of the procedural element of unconscionability may be defeated, if the complaining
party has a meaningful choice of reasonably available alternative sources of supply from which to obtain
the desired goods and services free of the terms claimed to be unconscionable.”); Bradberry v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., 2007 WL 1241936 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) (where the court implied that had the defendant
brought evidence “regarding the availability of alternative sources of cellular phone service without the
allegedly unconscionable terms” it might have prevailed); Pack v. Damon Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 545, 556
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (finding no procedural unconscionability in an arbitration clause because the “[p]laintiff
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preceding analysis shows that this sort of reasoning is flawed: the more numerous are the
supplier’s rivals who do not use the TOT, the less likely is the TOT to be competed away,
and the more suspicious courts should be toward it. In such cases, rivals will be less
likely to expose the supplier’s TOT, because they will fear that the benefits from such an
exposition will be externalized to the other suppliers not using the oppressive term.
To be sure, if all suppliers in the market use the TOT, or similar TOTs, although
benefit externalization does not exist, all such suppliers would fear consumer backfiring
on the contract: They might hesitate to expose rivals’ TOTs so as not to have to stop
using their own TOTs. Therefore, the ideal market in this respect is one in which almost
all suppliers use the TOT (or similar practices). In such a case, the few suppliers not
using the TOT, or similar TOTs, are not exposed to consumer backfiring on the contract
(since they are not using such TOTs to begin with) and benefit externalization remains
particularly small (since the number of rivals not using such TOTs is small).
b. The Existence of Sales Representatives in Contact with Consumers
The analysis of Part II reveals that when Supplier X’s rivals employ sales
representatives, who are in direct contact with consumers, these rivals are more likely to
expose Supplier X’s TOTs. Suppose again that Supplier X is the dry cleaner employing
the TOT from Example 2. Assume Dry Cleaner X has a rival, Dry Cleaner Y. Dry
Cleaner Y’s employees, operating Y’s facility, are in direct contact with customers. They
could use this direct contact to highlight the existence of Dry Cleaner X’s TOT.
Such direct interaction could help overcome consumer irresponsiveness and could
mitigate the fear of rivals’ backfiring. It could alleviate consumers’ irresponsiveness
because consumers present at Y’s facility are more alert to the direct messages conveyed
to them by Y’s employees and agents. Direct contact also relieves some of Y’s fear of
retaliation from Supplier X because, unlike criticism made via public advertising,
Supplier X need not know that Supplier Y’s employees have criticized him in this
manner.
Conversely, if Supplier X’s rivals do not have such direct contact with consumers,
they are less likely to expose Supplier X’s TOT. Suppose, for example, that Supplier X,
like his rivals, sell electronic products over the Internet.134 Absent direct contact between
Supplier X’s rivals and consumers, consumer irresponsiveness and the fear of Supplier
X’s retaliation may, in certain cases, deter X’s rivals from criticizing his contracts.135

has not shown that [defendant] was his only source for buying a new motor home, or that other potential
sources required submitting disputes to arbitration”).
134
See Hillman, supra note 107, at 840-2 (explaining that on-line consumers tend not to read their
contracts, because negotiation is impossible).
135
While the absence of sales representatives does not necessarily imply that consumers are
irresponsive, it demands that the question of consumers’ responsiveness be further examined.
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c. Is the Product or Service Essential to Consumers?
Suppose the product or service sold by the supplier using the TOT is essential to
consumers, such as a drug that cures a certain illness, but the supplier’s market is
nevertheless competitive. For example, there are several other suppliers who sell drugs
that cure the same illness. How should courts treat a TOT exempting a supplier from
liability for the drug's side effects? Courts treat such TOTs with particular suspicion, and
often strike them down as unconscionable.136
In contrast, our analysis reveals that such TOTs are actually less susceptible to
"backfiring on the product" and in this sense are more exposed to competition over
contracts. The reason is that when a product or service is essential to consumers they
would not easily give up purchasing it. As a result, rival suppliers of such products or
services would not hesitate to criticize a supplier using such a TOT (subject to the other
factors that could hinder competition over contracts). These rival suppliers know that
even if their criticism would reveal unpleasant information about the product or service,
consumers would still buy it. In the above-mentioned drug example, rival suppliers would
not hesitate to highlight that their rival exempts itself, in the fine print from liability for
the drug’s side effects. If the drug is essential to consumers, demand for the drug would
not substantially go down, in spite of consumers becoming aware of its side effects.
Therefore, under our approach, with essential products or services (sold by a competitive
industry) courts should actually count more on competition over contracts, and intervene
less, than with other products and services in which there is a threat of backfiring on the
product..
d. Alternative Parties Likely to Expose the TOT
As noted, at times the exposition of a supplier’s inefficient or unfair TOT could
come from parties other than the supplier’s rivals, such as consumer organizations or
websites.137 Such parties could play a role similar to that of competition over contracts in
deterring suppliers from placing inefficient or unfair TOTs in their fine print. Note that
this deterrent effect is not subject to backfiring, attraction of unwanted consumers or
benefit externalization. These are factors that restrain only rivals' criticism of the
supplier's TOT and not criticism by objective parties from outside the supplier's market.
Accordingly, if the court finds that in the supplier’s market, oppressive terms in
consumer contracts are subject to close scrutiny by reliable parties, whose interests

136

See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963) ("As a result of the
essential nature of [medical services], in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking
exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who
seeks his services."); Ransburg D/B/A Twin Lakes Apartments v. Richards, 770 N.E.2d 393 (Ct. App.
Indiana, 5th Dist., 2002) (striking down an exculpatory clause due to the essential nature of the service);
Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. 1992) (same).
137
Supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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coincide with those of consumers, and in addition many consumers are likely to become
informed by such parties, court intervention is unnecessary.
The above-mentioned guidelines for courts are summarized in the following table.
TABLE 2: GUIDELINES FOR COURTS
Prima Facie Case for Intervention
No Intervention
Criticizing TOT provides negative
Criticizing TOT provides negative information
information about the product/service
about the supplier
(consumers’ backfiring on product)
(no consumers’ backfiring on product)
Criticizing TOT attracts high-cost
Criticizing TOT attracts low-cost or average
consumers
consumers
(unwanted consumers)
(wanted consumers)
Small transactions
Large transactions
(irresponsive consumers)
(responsive consumers)
TOT qualifies an express benefit granted by the
TOT qualifies a default rule
supplier
(backfiring on the product, attraction of
(backfiring on the product, attraction of unwanted
unwanted consumers, and consumer
consumers, and consumer irresponsiveness
irresponsiveness could be strong)
usually weak)
Almost all suppliers use similar TOTs
Few suppliers use similar TOTs
(most benefits internalized and no concern of
(benefit externalization)
backfire on the contract)
No sales representatives
(rivals’ backfiring, risk of irresponsive
consumers)
Product is inessential
(backfiring on the product possible)
No alternative parties likely to expose the
TOT (no alternative to competition over
contracts)

Sales representatives exist
(less rivals’ backfiring, consumers more
responsive)
Product is essential
(no backfiring on the product)
Alternative parties likely to expose the TOT (an
alternative to competition over contracts)

To finalize our guidelines, it should be noted that our market-based approach could
also be employed ex ante, rather than ex post.138 That is, an agency could decide ex ante
whether a standard consumer contract was efficient according to our proposed guidelines,
and once the agency decided affirmatively, the contract would be immune from courts’
scrutiny for a certain period of time. There are several advantages to ex ante scrutiny.
First, it would save litigation costs, since the contract would be litigated only once, while
with ex post intervention litigation reoccurs whenever consumers sue the supplier.
Second a specialized agency conducting ex ante scrutiny would likely be more apt and
skillful than courts in applying the market-based guidelines we propose. Finally, ex ante
scrutiny would promote certainty: once a contract was approved by the agency, the
supplier could be confident that none of his contract's clauses would be struck down.
138

Cf. Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be
Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723 (2008). (arguing for ex ante scrutiny of consumer contracts).
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CONCLUSION
The Article presents four oppressive techniques which suppliers often use in their
standard-form contracts to extract value from uninformed consumers: TOTs, SOTs, SBTs
and complexity. Only the first technique is closely scrutinized by courts. Ironically,
courts' attention is much more needed with respect to the other three techniques, which
are currently ignored by them, since these techniques are expected to survive even fierce
competition among suppliers. Especially two of these practices – SOTs and complexity –
could lead to substantial social harm if not closely scrutinized.
TOTs, on the other hand, are potentially affected by competition. The type of
competition that affects TOTs is competition over contracts, rather than over price or
quality. When competition over contracts exists it has the potential to close the
information gap between suppliers and consumers, thereby securing efficient and fair
contracts. Furthermore, even a threat of such competition would suffice in order to assure
the efficiency and fairness of suppliers’ contracts.
Accordingly, we suggest the application of a market-based approach to TOTs in
consumer contracts, instead of scrutinizing them on the basis of the discrete transaction
and its particular characteristics, as courts currently do. According to the market-based
approach, TOTs should be assessed in light of the intensity of competition over contracts
in the supplier’s market. The Article reveals the observable characteristics of the
supplier’s market, and of the type of TOT or transaction, which determine the viability of
competition over contracts in this market. When competition over contracts is shown to
be able to close the information gap, intervention against the TOT is unwarranted. When
competition over contracts cannot be counted upon to inform consumers, the burden
should be transferred to the supplier to show that her TOT is nevertheless efficient and
fair, as otherwise the TOT will be struck down.
This Article thus presents a third phase in courts' attitudes toward consumer
contracts. In the first phase, consumer contracts were considered by courts as ordinary
contracts, requiring no special treatment. In the second phase, courts became suspicious
of consumer contracts and developed several tools for handling them, focusing on the
particular characteristics of the transaction. In this Article, we suggest that it is time to
introduce a third phase: Rather than examining each consumer contract in isolation,
courts need to acknowledge that consumer contracts are a market-phenomenon which
calls for a market-based approach.
Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Ariel Porat
porata@post.tau.ac.il
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